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The objective of this study is to utilize background characteristics to determine
predictors of success from Marine Security School. The data used consist of files on fifteen
MSG classes of sergeants (E5s), corporals (E4s), and lance corporals (E3s) who reported to
MSG Battalion for school. These classes cover the period from December 1989 to
September 1991. The data file included close to 20 background characteristics that were
evaluated in this study. The logistic procedure was selected to analyze this data set since
it gives a more precise picture of results than simple regression when using multiple
independent variables. Six variables were found to be statistically significant below the ten
percent level in predicting success of Marines at MSG school. These are the physical
fitness score, rifle score, GT score, current age, current grade, race, and time in grade.
Using the logit model, example cases are presented to show the user how each Marine's
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I . INTRODUCTION
A . BACKGROUND
Since its inception in late 1948, the Marine Security
Guard (MSG) program is, and has been, the foundation of the
State Department's interior security effort at embassies,
consulates, and legations worldwide. Prior to this, with few
exceptions, our missions abroad were guarded by American
national civilian guards. This system worked well until the
end of World War II. This period saw rising costs and
decreasing morale as those guards previously willing to serve
without dependents, now wanted their dependents with them. At
the same time more posts began to open. When it became
obvious that a tightly disciplined force was required to do
the job, the State Department turned to the Marine Corps.
(Gutensohn, 1988)
However, what was only supposed to be a short term
solution to this guard staffing problem has turned into over
40 years of unparalleled distinctive service. It is
unfortunate that most Americans have only come to know about
the MSG program as a result of the Lonetree spy scandal in
1987. The program came under much scrutiny as result of this
case. Fortunately, most experts and agencies who conducted
indepth investigations into the matter concluded that the
Lonetree case was an aberration. The program is alive and
well! Embassy Marines, as they have come to be known, today
enjoy an outstanding reputation throughout the Diplomatic
world. (Gutensohn, 1988) Marines serve in over 120 countries
and independent cities at over 140 embassies, legations, and
consulates. There are currently more than 1400 Marines on
duty at these diplomatic missions.
B. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE
Currently, the MSG program is comprised strictly of
volunteers. As a result of some minor recruiting problems (of
volunteers for MSG duty) during 1991, but also due to the
downsizing of the active forces in the near future, it • is
possible that the MSG Battalion may experience difficulties in
attracting enough volunteers for MSG duty to meet all of its
established table of organization (T/O) requirements. That
is, there may not be enough Marines to fill all of the billets
at diplomatic missions throughout the world. If it is
established that a certain profile Marine would be more likely
to graduate from the school than another Marine, a cost
savings in human capital and permanent change of station (PCS)
dollars could be accomplished.
The objective of this thesis is to examine predictors of
success at MSG school. Most importantly, this information
could be applied now to our MSG volunteer force, but could
also be applied if the Marine Corps had to resort to a non-
volunteer program. In this manner, Marine Corps manpower
assignment personnel could select those individuals most
likely to graduate from MSG school while at the same time
administering control over MOS populations.
This objective will be met by evaluating the complete data
file of background characteristics from the Headquarters
Master File (HMF) of Marines in the grade of Sergeant (E-5)
and below from 15 recent MSG school classes. This analysis
will produce a composite profile of the "ideal" Marine that we
could look for in a screening process for selection to MSG
school, that is, the best candidate for successful completion
of MSG school.
C . METHODOLOGY
In order to obtain current and background data, files were
requested and received from Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps
(HQMC) (POS), Washington, D. C. and MSG Battalion, Quantico,
Virginia, on 15 recent MSG classes of sergeants and below who
reported to MSG Battalion for school over a three year period
(1989 through 1991) . To start the ball rolling, MSG Battalion
initially provided HQMC with a file containing the start date
of the course, the name, social security number (SSN), grade-
point average (GPA) , and attrition information (if the Marine
did not complete the course) . This data file was then
matched, by SSN, to the HMF. As a result of this matching,
the data file contains the following background
characteristics: grade, race, sex, education level, length of
enlistment, Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB)
scores, physical fitness test (PFT) information, rifle
marksmanship information, military occupational specialty
(MOS) , time in service, time in grade, and age at entry to MSG
school. This data is the basis for the analysis to determine
if there is a correlation between success in MSG school and
other characteristics of the individual Marine. To the degree
possible, individual MSG student attrition rates, and reasons
therein, were also analyzed against information from the HMF
.
In addition, it was imperative to at least briefly
consider the non-data related issues of failure/success from
MSG school. Although a data-analysis will ultimately have the
biggest impact on this decision of who to send to the school,
other non-data issues must also be considered to some degree.
These areas should be as clearly defined as possible in Marine
Corps Order (MCO) 1306. 2N so that commanders in the field will
be able to weed out, based on input from MSG Battalion on
previous classes, those individuals that are least likely to
fare well at the school.
D. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS
To provide an understanding of the importance of the MSG
program, Chapter II details the history and significance of
MSGs . Chapter III of this thesis provides an overview of
previous research conducted in the area of screening and
predicting success not only at MSG school, but other military
schools. Chapter IV describes the process and methodology
used for this thesis. Chapter V provides the data, model
summaries, and an analysis of the data compiled. Chapter VI
takes a look at the non-data factors that must also be taken
into consideration with the quantitative results in order to
give a complete picture of the potential MSG the Marine Corps
is looking for. Chapter VII provides conclusions to this
thesis and offers recommendations and observations derived
from this analysis.
II. THE MARINE SECURITY PROGRAM
A. MISSION
The mission of the Marine Security Guards (MSGs) is to
provide security services at designated United States
diplomatic and consular facilities to prevent the
compromise of classified material and equipment which, if
compromised, will cause serious damage to the national
security interests of the United States and to provide
protection for United States citizens and property within
the principal building of the mission. These detachments
will be prepared to execute plans for the protection of
the Foreign Service post and its personnel as directed by
the Chief of Mission or principal officer. Under certain
emergency situations they will provide special protective
services to the Chief of Mission or principal officer.
(U.S. MCO, 1992, p. 6, Encl (5))
B . BACKGROUND
The relationship between the Marine Corps and the State
Department covers nearly two centuries and can be traced
from the storied "Shores of Tripoli" to the present hour.
Marines have stood watch at our Diplomatic Missions from
the beginnings, in times of war, insurrection, and
natural calamity. The modern MSG program was initiated in
1949. More than 20,000 Marines have shared the duty since
that time and have built an unprecedented institution and
reputation. (Gutensohn, 1988, p. Ill)
Marines stood watch for varying periods at many of our
missions in the years between the World Wars . As a result of
this, and expeditions in Asia and the Caribbean at the dictate
of American foreign policy, the Marine Corps was commonly
referred to in some circles of civilians and its own members
alike as "State Department Troops." With the outbreak of
World War II, all experienced officers and non-commissioned
officers were at a premium. Those serving outside the
overflowing training and combat commands (i.e., plenty of
troops, but no leaders) were thus returned to those arenas.
(Gutensohn, 1988)
With few exceptions the war years saw the hiring of
American national civilians for the protection of its
establishments. This system, though not the most ideal,
seemed to work well during the war. Shortly after the end of
hostilities, problems, both old and new, began to surface.
The guards that the Department of State had been using were of
doubtful character, limited ability and, in many cases,
unsuitable for a position requiring such a high degree of
trust and confidence. Those that had potential could see no
chance of bettering their situation since there was little
chance for advancement beyond the most basic Foreign Service
staff levels. Guards who had previously been willing to serve
abroad without dependents now wanted their families with them.
Because this was viewed as unrealistically costly, morale
problems began to develop. (Gutensohn, 1988)
Thus, in the period of: 1) growing international tension
that existed in 1947, and 2) when scores of posts were being
opened or reopened, including ultra-sensitive missions in
Eastern Europe, thoughts turned toward the establishment of a
guard force that was young, alert, well-trained and tightly
disciplined to do the job. The Army was initially asked to
assume what was supposed to be short term duties, but they
declined. It was in late 1947 that the State Department again
turned to the Marine Corps by requesting that the War
Department (now known today as the Department of Defense)
provide enlisted Marine watchstanders and supervisory officers
pursuant to the Foreign Service Act (FSA) of 1946, to furnish
security services at selected missions. (Gutensohn, 1988)
(Note: Specifically, the FSA of 1946 authorized the Secretary
of the Navy to assign enlisted members of the Naval Service to
serve as custodians at embassies, legations, and consulates
under the supervision of the principal officer.) (Defense
Policy Panel, 1987)
It is thought by some that the reason the Marine Crops
even accepted this mission was one of political expediency.
The Corps was trying to enlist the support of General George
Marshall, then Secretary of State, as a counter to President
Truman and Secretary of Defense Johnson during a period when
support by the latter two for continued existence of the
Marine Corps was waning. (Defense Policy Panel, 1987)
Again, as touched upon earlier, this duty was thought by
the Marine Corps to only be a short term solution to the State
Department's security problems overseas. Here we are though
over 40 years later and still serving proudly in an ever-
expanding role.
On December 15, 1948, a formal Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) was signed by the Secretary of State and Secretary of
the Navy. The MOA has changed and been signed five times to
update administrative and control procedures, but also
specifying the use of Marines as security guards.
The MOA explains that Marines function as armed interior
buildings guards, and that they provide security services
which include assuring that laws, regulations, and post
policies relating to security matters are adhered to.
They provide interior control of visitors and traffic
control surveillance of construction and maintenance work,
and a watch over the activity of foreign nationals in
sensitive areas. They conduct in-depth security checks
during working and non-working hours and issue formal
security violation notices if deviations are identified.
Marines may also be tasked with providing special
protective services (i.e., bodyguards) . (Gutensohn, 1988,
p. 6) )
The MOA is, in theory, a binding agreement that outlines
the working relationship of two very large federal
bureaucracies and their members who are located in many
different posts overseas. (Shelton, 1990)
C . WATCHSTANDERS
Sergeants (E-5) and below who stand guard duty at the
Department of State missions abroad are often referred to as
watchstanders . Though at times exotic, MSG duty is, more
often than not, nothing more than walking a post overseas;
glorified guard duty if you will. (Shelton, 1987) Yet, a
Marine alone on post in an embassy or consulate, as he often
is, is in a position of great responsibility, far more so than
the average Marine of commensurate grade. Marine
watchstanders in the program come from a variety of MOS skill
experiences and backgrounds whose assignment on MSG duty is
the only duty where they will have major independent
responsibilities. Moreover, MSGs will serve additional duties
during their tour in order to help the detachment function as
a team, whether it be serving as assistant detachment
commander or organizing the detachment bar, ball, or mess
fund.
The tour of duty is a 30 month split tour. The first 15
months is generally spent at a hardship post, while the last
15 months is spent at a non-hardship post. The definition of
hardship is based on such things as economic conditions in the
country/city, rigorous duty, isolation, and other extra-
ordinary conditions. There are some exceptions to this such
as assignments to Moscow and other Eastern European countries
(sometimes referred to as designated posts), which are only
six months in length. Requests for extensions both on post
and on the program are considered on a case by case basis.
The average watchstander is 24 years old.
In addition to what is known as Post #1 inside the main
building entrances (chancery) of all overseas missions, MSGs
may also stand duty on the grounds of the Ambassador's
residence. Another post may be located in, or close to, the
consular section (if it is distanced from the chancery)
.
These are all armed posts and the Marine may be in military
uniform or in civilian clothes (suit and tie) depending on the
desires of the host country. Generally, Marines are in
uniform when standing post on the embassy or consulate
grounds, but may be required to wear civilian clothes when on
10
duty at a post outside of the compound (i.e., the ambassador's
residence)
.
Watchstanders generally leave the program with well-
rounded skills, and greater potential and leadership skills
than their peers who have not served on an independent duty of
this nature. (Siverson, 1987)
D. THE DETACHMENT COMMANDER
Though this study only analyzes data on watchstanders, the
role of all those in a detachment should be understood. In
fact, it is the staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) assigned
to the MSG program and who is considered a detachment
commander, (there are a few SNCOs that are on the program that
are assistant detachment commanders at some of the larger
detachments) that is the vital link in ensuring the
communication lines remain open between the regional security
officer (RSO) , MSG Battalion, himself, and the watchstanders.
He is there to represent the best interests of the Marine
Corps, while at the same time providing constructive input to
the RSO regarding security of the mission.
SNCO selection boards are briefed that a successful tour
as a MSG is indicative of superior leadership qualities and
that the billet assignment of detachment commander and/or
assistant detachment commander requires that individuals
assume a command billet or perform as an executive officer.
(U.S. MCO, 1992)
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Indeed, "SNCOs assigned to the program have an awesome
responsibility and must be able to lead their detachment with
the highest degree of professional ability and standards. Not
only must their professionalism be directed toward the Marines
of the detachment, but also toward State Department personnel
and, at times, foreign diplomats." (Siverson, 1987, p. 20)
SNCOs assigned to MSG duty are the finest the Marine Corps has
to offer. Much like the watchstander , the detachment
commander tour of duty is a 36 month split tour wherein 18
months will probably be spent at a hardship post and the other
18 months will be spent at a non-hardship post. The average
age of SNCOs assigned to MSG duty is 2 9 years old, and the
individual has approximately 11 years of service.
E. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The MSG is assigned to the embassy to safe- guard
classified material, enforce security regulations, and
protect /American lives and property. When the embassy's
daily business is completed, the Marine on duty continues
the workday. MSGs check unoccupied offices for classified
material left adrift, look for open doors and windows, and
check the general security of the building. Safes and
files are inspected to ensure they are properly secured.
MSGs often escort a cleaning force of foreign employees
and work closely with the embassy duty officer after
working hours . MSGs must be capable of maintaining their
composure in the event of riots, mob action or terrorist
activity. They must be able to think clearly and follow
detailed instructions at all times. MSGs work closely
with their fellow Marines and in some cases with members
of the United States Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Air
Force. They have daily contact with American and foreign
employees of the embassy. (U.S. MCO, 1992, p. 2, Encl (2))
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There will also be, to a limited degree, social activities
with the American community and in some countries, with
foreign nationals.
The embassy Marine represents the United States and the
Marine Corps. Therefore, they must present a neat
military appearance, be adept at self-expression, and
perform their duties in a firm, courteous and tactful
manner The MSG could be placed in situations of possible
compromise which require sound judgment, a high degree of
moral integrity, honesty, loyalty, and unquestionable
devotion to duty. (U.S. MCO, 1992, p. 2, Encl (2))
Living conditions differ significantly from what the
Marine, accustomed to hotel-style barracks and quonset huts in
the United States and at other overseas duty locations, is
likely to encounter on MSG duty.
MSGs live together in fully furnished quarters provided by
the Department of State. In most countries they live in
a house with each Marine normally assigned an individual
bedroom At those detachments where women Marine are
assigned, separate bedroom, bath, and toilet
accommodations will be provided for the women. This house
is located in the civilian community of the city or on the
embassy compound. The detachment members, under the
direction of the detachment commander, are responsible for
the operation of their quarters. They do this, as covered
briefly earlier, by assessing, collecting, and managing
the funds provided for the operation of the mess. MSGs
become bookkeepers and auditors by managing the mess
quarters for their fellow Marines. (U.S. MCO, 1992, p. 3,
Encl (2))
Marines will rotate collateral duties such as Detachment
Mess Fund Manager, Detachment Bar Fund Manager, or Detachment
Ball Fund Manager.
13
F. SCREENING AND CRITERIA FOR THE PROGRAM
The Marine Corps uses perhaps the most extensive screening
process for any assignment a Marine may be ordered to. Before
a Sergeant and below can even consider applying to the program
he must meet a detailed list of eligibility criteria. The
main items from that list of criteria include:
1 . Be unmarried and agree to remain unmarried until
completion of their entire tour on the program.
2. Have at least 32 months obligated service remaining upon
reporting to MSG school.
3. If a corporal (E-4) or lance corporal (E-3), have
minimum average conduct and proficiency markings of 4.2 and
4.2, respectively. These performance evaluation markings
are given to E-2/3/4s semiannually.
4. Be a volunteer.
5. Be a United States Citizen (by birth or naturalized)
.
6. Meet Marine Corps standards for personal appearance/
weight and have passed a physical fitness test within 60
days of reporting to MSG school.
7 . Be medically screened for overseas assignment and class
I dental.
8. Have a minimum derived AFQT/GT score of 90.
(U.S. MCO, 1992)
There are additional criteria the detachment commander must
meet, but since the thrust of this thesis is on the watch-
stander I will exclude these and move on.
It was decided with the inception of the program in 1948,
that watchstanders would be single upon recruitment and agree
to remain single during their tour of duty with the State
Department. Marriage during a tour is, and always has been,
14
grounds for a Marine's relief from assignment. The single
watchstander policy is based upon cost of housing, travel and
other expenses, and the fact that Marines don't need to be
worrying about loved ones closeby when their primary focus
must be on the security of the embassy. Consideration is also
given to the need for immediate worldwide mobility on the part
of individual Marines who could be ordered to move from post
to post or continent to continent, on a moment's notice.
(Gutensohn, 1988) This could be part of a permanent or
temporary move to support short term diplomatic security
requirements. An example of the latter might be if the
Secretary of State visits an overseas location. MSG
volunteers are solicited to augment the security forces for
that visit. These guidelines and the justification for their
continued existence remain in effect today just as they did 44
years ago at the outset of the program.
There are also factors that are considered disqualifying
for perspective applicants. These include:
1. Conviction by general courts-martial.
2. Conviction by special or summary courts-martial within
five years of applying for the program.
3. A record of nonjudicial punishment within one year of
applying for the program.
4. A record of a civilian felony conviction with twelve
months of applying for the program.






7. Any family, personal, or medical problems which would
preclude an overseas assignment.
8. Any derogatory information in an applicant's background
which may jeopardize a top secret clearance.
(U.S. MCO, 1992)
Once all criteria have been met as described above, each
applicant must be interviewed by his commanding officer. This
interview is considered the most important element in the
screening process. (Defense Policy Panel, 1987) As a
precursor to this interview, the U.S. MCO (1992) highly
encourages units to conduct screening boards, consisting of
former MSG detachment commander or company officers . At all
levels of the screening process, careful consideration must be
given to the maturity, stability, financial situation, and
motivation of the applicant. On the forwarding endorsements,
commanders must comment on the applicant's suitability and any
unique warrior or combat enhancing skills of women Marines
applying for the program. In addition, an extensive
"Commanding Officer's Checklist," contained in the Marine
Corps Order governing the program, must be completed by the
commander and then hand carried by the Marine selected for MSG
school. (U.S. MCO, 1992)
As incentives, the Commanding Officer, MSG Battalion, is
authorized to:
1. Add a bonus of 100 points to the composite score (for
promotion) of MSGs upon completion of MSG school.
2. Meritoriously promote, or recommend meritorious
promotion in the case of SNCO grades, a select percentage of
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qualified Marines to the grade of corporal through gunnery
sergeant (E-7) on a quarterly basis. (U.S. MCO, 1992)
As with any process, the MSG screening program is not
infallible. There will always be human failures no matter how
thorough we are in screening. The only thing the Marine Corps
can do is continue to take steps, as it has done, to
continually fine tune the procedures used. (International
Operations Subcommittee, 1987)




Every overseas post falls under the command of a chief of
mission, usually an ambassador, who is appointed directly
by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The chief
of mission is answerable, in strictest terms, only to the
President for his actions. For MSGs, the operational
chain of command then usually runs to the regional
security officer (RSO) , who reports directly to the
ambassador, the consul for administrative affairs, or any
other officers that the ambassador desires. The RSO is
charged with the protection and defense of American lives,
classified material, and U.S. Government property for the
post or posts to which he is assigned. As such, he is the
operational supervisor for the MSG detachment and directly
controls and employs the Marines assigned to his security
force with the operational aspects of protection and
defense of overseas diplomatic missions. They are both
morally and legally responsible for all that can effect
the health, welfare, and safety of the Marines assigned to
their care. (Shelton, 1990, p. 4)
2 . Marine Corps
"The administrative chain of command, which covers
recruitment, training, equipping, organization, and
discipline, etc., rests full authority with the Commandant of
the Marine Corps and his designees: the Commanding Officer,
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MSG Battalion, the Plans, Policies, and Operations (POS)
Division at Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, and the company
commander in the field." (Gutensohn, 1988, p. 6)
MSG Battalion is commanded by a colonel and consists
of a headquarters and training elements with about 80
permanent personnel located in Quantico, Virginia. It
services 140 worldwide detachments located in over 120
countries, which range in size from six to 39 members (an
average of nine per post) ; a total of over 1,400 Marines.
Company level commands, of which there are seven, are headed
up by a lieutenant colonel. He is supported by two company
grade officers, usually captains, and an administrative staff
that usually numbers from five to eight enlisted Marines. The
companies are as follows:
• Company "A" is headquartered in Frankfort, West Germany
and is responsible for detachments in Eastern Europe.
• Company "B" headquartered in Casablanca, Morocco, has
under its administrative control posts located throughout
North Africa and the Middle East.
• Company "C" is located in Bangkok, Thailand and is
responsible for detachments in the Far East, the southern
Pacific area, and those on the Asian subcontinent.
• Company "D" is headquartered in Miami, Florida and
controls detachments located throughout the Caribbean and
Central and South America.
• Company "E" is located in Frankfort, West Germany and has
under its administrative control detachments in Ottawa,
Canada and Reykjavik, Iceland.
• Company "F" is headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya and
administers posts located in Eastern Africa, Madagascar,
and the Mauritius Islands.
• Company "G" is headquartered in Abidjan, Ivory Coast and
is responsible for detachments located throughout Western
Africa. (U.S. MCO, 1992)
H. MARINE SECURITY GUARD SCHOOL
1. Mission
The mission of MSGs is to provide security services at
designated U. S. diplomatic and consular facilities to
prevent the compromise of classified material and
equipment which, if compromised, will cause serious damage
to the national security interests of the U.S., and to
provide protection for U. S. citizens and property within
the principal building of the mission. These detachments
will be prepared to execute plans for the protection of
the Foreign Service post and its personnel as directed by
the chief of mission or principal officer. Under certain
emergency situations they will provide special protective
services to the chief of mission or principal officer.
(U.S. MCO, 1992, p. 6, Encl (5))
2 . Scope
Prior to assignment overseas, Marines must
successfully complete a course of instruction at MSG school.
Instruction at the school, a brick building that is configured
in and out as an actual embassy, is presented jointly by the
Marine Corps (all instructors are former MSGs) and the
Department of State, and funded by the latter. (Gutensohn,
1988) About 60 percent of the instruction is presented by MSG
Battalion, 30 percent by the Department of State, with ten
percent by other agencies . The curriculum is reviewed and
updated annually.
At least five classes of 100 to 150 Marines a year are
put through the rigors of this course. This equates to
roughly 254 hours of classroom instruction or a total of 350
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hours of a student's time when physical training, inspections,
and standing duty are added in. Seventy hours of the
instruction are allocated to the functional areas of "Coping
with a Foreign Environment," and performing security
functions. These are further divided into such areas as:
conduct in a foreign environment, reporting contacts by
hostile agents, deterring hostile intelligence subversion,
classified material procedures, conducting security
inspections, and briefings on Eastern Europe (countries once
known as Eastern Bloc) . The remaining instruction focuses on
physical security aspects of MSG duty, such as marksmanship
skills, personal protective measures, and operating security
related equipment. (Defense Policy Panel, 1987)
Though Commandant of the Marine Corps General Munday
states that the Marines selected for MSG duty are the "cream
of the crop", (Defense Policy Panel, 1987, p. 14) there is
still an average 30% attrition rate from each MSG school
class. The MSG school offers a very strenuous course. The
schedule is:
set up to provide students with a rigorous academic
environment and an opportunity to operate under a high
degree of psychological and physical stress. Pressure
levels are turned up to the maximum so that instructors
and full-time clinical psychologist observers can assess
students before they graduate and move onto posts.
Marines are also rated individually by instructors on
their ability to operate in high-tension situations. They
are given written personality tests and are all afforded
several one-on-one sessions with the school psychologist
prior to graduation. If problems, academic, training or
other, are identified, a student will not graduate.
(Gutensohn, 1988, p. 13))
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Once in the program, all MSGs are expected to maintain
competence standards in their own MOS through correspondence
courses offered by the Marine Corps Institute (MCI),
Washington, D.C. Marines must be enrolled in a course at all
times. MSGs also review professional military subjects in
weekly Guard School sessions run by the detachment commander.
(Gutensohn, 1988) The course is as demanding as it sounds and
only those mentally and physically prepared are able to meet
the challenge.
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III. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
A . INTRODUCTION
The primary sources for information concerning this narrow
topic were the Defense Personnel Security Research and
Education Center (PERSEREC) and the Center For Naval Analyses
(CNA) . Points of contact established at Headquarters, U. S.
Marine Corps (HQMC) and MSG Battalion provided all other
studies and material available on the MSG program. Database
searches using the Defense Technical Information Center
(DTIC) , the National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
,
and the Semi-Automatic Bibliographic Retrieval System (SABIRS)
provided the literature surrounding civilian and other
military studies related to predicting success in schools and
the military.
In the mid-to-late 1980s, PERSEREC evaluated a variety of
predictor tests for potential use in screening and selecting
MSGs . This work will help facilitate efforts to update and
include more background characteristics in attempting to
pinpoint the Marine that is most likely to be successful, that
is, graduate, from MSG school. The data base used in this
thesis will be much larger and more current than that used by
PERSEREC. It will be interesting to compare whether the
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results derived in this thesis differ from any of the
screening criteria recommendations of PERSEREC
.
Previous to this endeavor by PERSEREC, the Institute for
Personality and Ability Testing, in November 1978, published
a report that also looked at predictors of success of MSGs
.
Specifically, they examined both the watchstander and
detachment commander at school and on post. They used a
combination of personality tests and background
characteristics for their study which will be discussed later
in this chapter.
More recently, a six page preliminary report was written
by the CNA in February 1992, that examined historical MSG
school data and began to develop a profile of a successful MSG
student. Some of the work done as part of this thesis
replicates that effort, but is expanded by the inclusion of
additional background characteristics and different cutoff
points to help determine success at the school.
There has been little research done in the area of
predicting student performance in military schools beyond
basic boot camp. The few that have been done and were most
closely related to this thesis were reviewed. While examining
these studies, one of the common threads I noted was that
predictor models are typically built from observed attrition.
This thesis analyzes attrition rates, but takes the process a
step further by analyzing and building a model that will
predict success. To glean insight into this area, the
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literature review includes attrition studies from both the
civilian and military arenas.
B. SPECIFIC MARINE SECURITY GUARD STUDIES
1. Institute for Personality and Ability Testing
From all indications, Sherman, Bergin, and Schmidt
(1978) were the first to undertake the task of trying to
predict success of MSGs . They analyzed psychological,
demographic, and MSG school performance measures to determine
which variables differentiate above average from below average
MSGs in three different areas: (1) MSGs on duty; (2)
watchstander candidates in MSG school; and (3) SNCOs (today
known as detachment commanders) . Though it looked at MSG
school students, their study was primarily "designed to
investigate the utility of psychological test information in
identifying MSGs likely to succeed on duty (versus graduate
from the school) and to select possible means of implementing
relevant findings as an adjunct to current selection
procedures." (Sherman et al . , 1978, p. 2-2) At that time
attrition on the program was ten percent, whereas in 1987 it
was down to around five percent (Defense Policy Panel, 1987)
.
Though this still may seem unusually high (it is consistent
with the Marine Corps-wide statistics) for such an elite force
who have been thoroughly screened, the rate can be attributed
to the demanding aspects of the duty and the insistence upon
the highest standards of performance.
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Since this thesis deals strictly with identifying
predictors of success for the Marine at MSG school and not
with predicting success while actually out on the duty itself,
the discussion is narrowed to only that portion of the Sherman
et al
.
, work. His group looked at two MSG classes totalling
202 students with an attrition number of 38 and rate of 23
percent. Today, that rate consistently remains over 30
percent (Akst, Quester, 1992)
.
For the watchstander candidate portion of the
analysis, the authors separated their study into those who
successfully completed training (n=164) and those who were
dropped from the program by one of the screening boards
(n=38) . In addition to the 16 Personality Factor
Questionnaire (16PF) (see Appendix A) , the Motivation Analysis
Test (MAT) (see Appendix A), and several variables from the
MSG Student Statistical Information Sheets, measures of MSG
school performance in six areas were taken from MSG school
rosters and included in the study. Mean figures on such
variables as: (1) time in service (TIS); (2) age; (3) General
Classification Test (GCT) score [see Appendix A] ; and (4) PFT
score, were taken from the statistical information sheets and
are found in Table 1. These sheets are filled out by the MSG
student during the first week of school. A comparison of the
means indicate that better GCT and PFT scores are related to
a more successful MSG student. These measures are also
significant factors in later studies by Wiskoff, Parker,
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Zimmerman, and Sherman (1989), and Akst and Quester (1992),
and can probably be tied to self -motivation within the
individual Marine. The difference between successful and
unsuccessful in the TIS and age categories is relatively
small. Again, a comparison of these means reveals a two month
TIS difference and a .17 age difference that would just not
appear to be, as a matter of practical significance, enough to
warrant changing prerequisites. The only variable from the
Table 1. MEAN SCORES OF MSG WATCHSTANDER CLASSES 2-87 AND









Last PFT Score 225.21 204.61
Source: Institute for Personality and Ability Testing
school rosters that correlates with items to be examined in
this thesis is that of the PFT score. This can be seen in
Table 2. PFT score appears to be an indicator of success at
MSG school. That is, the higher the PFT score the more likely
the Marine is to graduate from MSG school.
Using stepwise regression, Sherman et al . (1989)
developed a model that identified the best combinations of
predictor variables that separated successful from
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unsuccessful watchstander candidates in MSG school. They felt
Table 2. MSG CLASSES 2-7 8 AND 3-7 8 SCHOOL ROSTER PFT
INFORMATION
SUCCESSFUL UNSUCCESSFUL
LOW HIGH AVG LOW HIGH AVG
PFT 183 300 263.8 80 227 205.7
mrce : institute tor Personality and Ability Testing
the best equation that could be obtained was one in which only
from the two psychological tests ( PF and MAT) were utilized.
It becomes difficult to understand at this point why PFT
score, shown in Table 2 to vastly differ between those who
were successful and those who were not unsuccessful at MSG
school, was then not included as part of this "best equation, "
when the authors also state that "higher scores contribute to
success." (Sherman et al . , 1978) This is further confounded
when the authors acknowledge that better MSGs (on the duty)
tend to have higher PFT scores, yet that performance in MSG
school "should have relatively little, if any, impact on
future performance as an MSG." (Sherman et al . , 1978) The
authors seem to have missed tying together the apparent PFT




2. PERSEREC- -Predicting Success at MSG School
The approach taken in this very thorough PERSEREC
study was "to correlate biographical data and psychological
test scores with criteria of MSG school and job performance"
(Wiskoff et al
.
, 1989, p.iv) in developing procedures to be
used in screening applicants for MSG school. A total of 1,131
students in 1987 and 1988 were administered aptitude/
achievement tests and had personal history data analyzed in
order to better predict performance at MSG school . This group
of MSGs experienced a 27.3 percent attrition rate in school.
Wiskoff et al . (1989), determined that the screening of
applicants would be most effective using a combination of
background variables and the Special Assignment Battery (SAB)
(see Appendix A) . Specifically, the background variables
found to be most predictive were: (1) General Technical (GT)
score (see Appendix A) from the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) [see Appendix A]; (2) PFT score; and
(3) total indebtedness. Minimum eligibility scores were
established for these variables that would reduce attrition,
but not significantly reduce the pool of Marines available for
MSG school (Wiskoff et al . , 1989). In so doing they
determined, after examining the distribution of scores in
relation to a pass/fail criteria, the level at which there was
a probability of the applicant passing the Screening Board
evaluation of at least 50 percent
.
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The minimum GT score cutoff was determined to be a 90.
Though the school had this requirement in place, in writing,
waivers had been granted for GTs less than 90. Of these, a 50
percent attrition rate was evidenced.
Marines with a PFT score below 170 points were also
found to have an attrition rate of 50 percent. Table 3 shows
that as PFT score increased, the failure rate of MSGs
decreased. The PFT score used by Wiskoff et al . (1989), is
Table 3. COMPARISON OF MSG SCHOOL PASS/FAIL RATE WITH PFT
SCORE
PFT SCORE % PASS SCHOOL % FAIL SCHOOL





290 or More 84% 16%
Source: PERSEREC
from the inventory PFT taken upon arrival at school, not the
score from the last PFT taken at the Marine's previous
command. Two schools of thought exist here: (1) the
perspective MSG had time to get out of shape in the 3 days of
leave (maximum generally allowed) prior to reporting to the
school; or (2) prior to reporting to the school, whether
directly from his last command or from leave, he had time to
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get himself into shape. The relationship between the higher
PFT scores and success at MSG school is best explained by the
motivation and drive within the individual Marine to excel.
All Marine Corps units are required to conduct physical
training three times a week--some do, some don't. In order to
do well on a PFT a Marine must be motivated enough to go out
on his own time to run or do whatever else is required to
attain the high PFT score.
Wiskoff et al. (1989) also found that MSG students with
a total debt greater than $11,000 had almost twice as much of
a chance at failure from the school (51%) as those whose debt
was less than $11,000.
The PFT and GT scores are certainly easy enough to
obtain through our automated systems, but indebtedness, though
Wiskoff et al. (1989) present it differently, is a subjective
area solely dependent upon information provided by the Marine.
If he is untruthful or forgets information, the data becomes
skewed. Thus, the study is incorrect in saying, particularly
with regard to financial information, "it would be simple to
employ them (GT, PFT, financial data) in screening for the MSG
school." (Wiskoff et al
.
, 1989, p. 71/72) Yes, financial
information, along with PFT and GT scores, would appear to be
a valid predictive tool, but the data would not always be
reliable enough to base an opinion on of whether an individual
would be successful or unsuccessful at MSG school unless this
information was provided as a result of the background
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investigation (BI) required of all MSGs . However, a BI is
only initiated once a Marine receives orders to the school
.
Many times the BI is not completed until a Marine is near the
end of completing MSG school. Thus, this financial
information could not be used as a pre-screening tool for the
school, but might be utilized as a screening tool for MSG
duty
.
When considered separately, the following percentages
of individuals would have been eliminated using the noted
cutoff scores: (1) 2.9 percent for the GT score with a cutoff
of 90; (2) 5.9 percent for a PFT cutoff score of 170; (3) 3.6
percent for indebtedness over $11,000; and (4) 10.4 percent
for the SAB cutoff of 87 (as measured on a scale using alpha
reliability percentages). (Wiskoff et al
.
, 1989)
3. PERSEREC--Life Experiences Questionnaire (LEQ)
The Life Experiences Questionnaire (LEQ) was conceived
and developed during 1987-89 based on research undertaken by
PERSEREC as part of the study by Wiskoff et al . (1989)
(Parker et al., 1989) . Prior to inception of the LEQ,
considerable weight in the selection process at MSG school was
given to background data recorded through the use of a student
questionnaire. The questions were open-ended responses and as
such were difficult to use in a systematic way to predict
future behavior. Thus, the development of the LEQ, a biodata
questionnaire in multiple choice format. The LEQ was
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administered to six MSG classes as questions were continually
added, dropped, and refined in order to develop the most
reliable set of LEQ scales.
The final version of the LEQ is a 200 item, multiple
choice, self-report inventory that assesses several
background and temperament domains. It is divided into a
number of scales, each of which has demonstrated ability
to identify successful performance in MSG school. (Parker
et al. , 1989, p. 4)
As shown in Table 4, eleven of the scales are
considered to be content -homogenous while the remaining five
scales are identified as nonhomogeneous . The "total
adjustment, " as it has come to be known, is considered one of
the best predictors of success at the school. It looks at the
following areas: (1) cooperativeness ; (2) conscientiousness;
(3) high school academics; (4) high school adjustment; (5)
high school sociability; and (6) legal/alcohol trouble.
Utilizing stepwise regression of the data and factor
analysis with each of the LEQ scales, it appears that LEQ is
a useful measure of the background and personality
characteristics thought to be required for success at MSG
school and on the program. As a result of this work, the LEQ
is a tool now in place and utilized at the MSG school as part
of the screening process of students. More emphasis and
detailed consideration though must be given to administering
this test prior to a Marine reporting to MSG school as part of
the screening for selection to the school, not giving the test
once the individual has reported to school . The intent of the
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LEQ is to screen out those less likely to successfully
complete the school. So unless this is an attempt at a
"concurrent" validation process, administering the test at the
Table 4. LIFE EXPERIENCES QUESTIONNAIRE (LEQ) SCALES
TYPE OF SCALE ALPHA RELIABILITY n ITEMS
I . CONTENT-HOMOGENOUS NA NA
Traditional Values .64 10
High School Academics .79 7
High School Adjustment .68 5
High School Sociability .64 7
Home /Family Life .79 16
Legal/Alcohol Trouble .51 4
Conscientiousness .76 11
Cooperativeness .76 8
Phys Fitness/Smoking .57 5
Ethical Conservatism .71 6
Social Desirability .67 11
II. NONHOMOGENEOUS .58 35
Parker-Fitz NA 15
S-Scale .65 50
Sherman Critical NA 10
Random Response NA NA
Source: PERSEREC
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school appears to defeat this intent. This study also
examined the use of background characteristics available in
the HMF for predicting success at MSG school.
4. CNA- -Attrition at MSG School
Due to problems encountered in 1991 by the Marine
Corps in attracting enough watchstander volunteers for the MSG
program, HQMC ( POS ) asked CNA to review recent MSG school data
and from this data attempt to characterize the successful MSG
student
.
Specifically, CNA was tasked to "analyze the
relationships between MSG school attrition and the background
characteristics of Marines who recently attended the school,
where these background characteristics would be restricted to
only what was readily available on the on-line personnel
system." (Akst, Quester, 1992) For the first time, a look at
MSG school success focused on information already at the
Marine Corps' disposal instead of using questionnaires and
personality tests to gather the majority of this data for
analysis. In addition, the characteristics used were from the
Headquarters Master File (HMF) data as of the quarter prior to
the start of the course, not data recorded while at school as
previous studies by Sherman et al . (1978), and Wiskoff et al
.
(1989) , had done.
Akst and Quester (1992) found that grade, PFT score,
and age at entry into the MSG school were the three
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characteristics which were most strongly associated with
success/ failure at the school (overall attrition rate from
their data file of 1,797 records was 37.5 percent) . Table 5
shows these results. Better GT and rifle scores also
reflected lower attrition rates.









LCpl/E-3 844 42 .2
Cpl/E-4 761 32.3
Sgt/E-5 192 37.0
PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST (PFT)
Category 1 1,327 34.5
Category 2 111 60.4
Category 3 20 75.0
AGE (WHEN COURSE BEGAN)
25 Years Old and Less 1,554 36.5
More Than 25 Years Old 238 43.5
Source: CNA
PFT score was broken into categories (or classes as
the Marine Corps appropriately terms them) where Category 1 is
the range of highest scores a Marine can score on the PFT and
Category 3 is the range of lowest scores. In their study,
Category 3 also contained those records where the PFT score
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was missing. There is a higher attrition rate in Categories
2 and 3 when compared with Category 1 . A wide disparity also
exists between grades with regard to attrition rate. Since
the age measurement indicates those 25 years old or less fared
much better than those over 25 years, we can say that younger
Marines have a better chance of success at the school.
However, we see from the grade comparison that there is a
point where this analogy does not hold up under scrutiny.
Lance corporals (E-3s), who are generally younger than
corporals (E-4s), performed worse than corporals. In fact,
the attrition rate for lance corporals was the highest of all
watchstanders . This might best be explained or attributed to
a lack of maturity on the part of the younger Marine.
Though definitely useful, the scope of the CNA paper
was somewhat limited. This could have been due to a
constraint on time or CNA may have given the Marine Corps all
that it asked for. Regardless, the door was left open by CNA
(and they acknowledged such) for further research and
analysis
.
C. OTHER MILITARY STUDIES
In an attempt to add credibility to the results of the MSG
studies, other studies done at military schools to predict
success were analyzed. The most closely related Marine Corps
study found was that done by Sawyer (1978) in which he
developed a model that predicted success of potential students
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at the Marine Corps Communications Electronics School (MCCES)
.
He found that if an incoming student scored low on the
PREMATH, NRT and ASVAB test composites [see Appendix A] , the
probability of success was greatly reduced. However, he also
discovered that "contradicting this was the finding that a
substantial percentage of the students were found to perform
adequately even when they had low scores." (Sawyer, 1978,
p. 65) This is where a cutoff score determination must be made
that will not undermine the desired usage of low ability test
score results. Other findings of interest, and merit, that
would be applicable to MSGs were found that were non-
quantifiable. They will be discussed in Chapter VI.
When discussing "independent duty", the Marine Corps
generally refers to three distinct areas/duty assignments.
They are recruiting duty, MSG duty, and drill instructor duty.
These are all very demanding assignments where successful
completion of a tour is considered a superb indication of
leadership and promotability . Thus, a study in one of these
areas may be pertinent to the other. In fact, in a phone
conversation with Dr. Aline Quester (1992), she stated the
analysis conducted on MSGs in February 1992 (Akst, Quester,
1992) was done with the intent that the model derived could
also be used to predict success of Marine Corps drill
instructors and recruiters.
In "Attributes of Drill Instructor School Graduates:
Stress-Related Factors " (Novaco, Sarason, Robinson, and Parry,
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1983), the authors primarily considered characteristics that
could be related to stress that would cause a student to fail
the Drill Instructor School. In addition though, demographic,
background, and aptitude factors were examined to determine
their effect, if any, on graduation rates from the school.
The study, unlike all others examined, found that training
outcome, or successful completion of the school, was not
related to aptitude scores (in this case the measure was of
GCT) . The inference here is that either aptitude level is not
a prerequisite of the school and the duty, or that criteria
for getting accepted as a drill instructor is perhaps more
stringent (i.e., GCT score requirement is higher) than the
other independent duty schools. In contrast, this finding of
a non-existent relationship between training outcome and
achievement tests differed from that part of the study that
found there was a significant relationship between class
standing and GCT score.
The study also showed that significantly older students
were dropped from the school for psychological/behavioral
reasons. The tendency was for graduates to be younger, on the
mean, than non-graduates. No correlation was found between
class standing and rank, years in the Marine Corps, MOS, or
level of education. However, again, like the achievement
tests, a significant effect was found between training
outcomes and MOS. Those with a support/administrative MOS had
a higher graduation rate (83.9 percent) that those with an
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infantry/artillery/engineer MOS (65 percent) or air wing MOS
( 51 percent )
.
Among other things, the study concluded that demographic
and personality factors distinguish graduates from non-
graduates . The demographic factors they considered
significant determinants were age and MOS. The results for
age are perhaps counterintuitive since one might expect that
candidates who are older, and thereby more mature, would be
most likely to be successful. On the contrary, graduates are
significantly younger than non-graduates. In addition, age
was found to be inversely related to class standing for those
who graduate. This suggests that maturity does not come with
age and thus, individuals should not be selected for Drill
Instructor School because they are older. (Novaco et al .
,
1983) This is contrary to the results found in the study by
Akst and Quester (1992) where they found the younger Marine
was less likely to graduate from MSG school. This becomes
interesting to note since Quester (1992) felt the results from
their study (Akst and Quester, 1992) could be applied to drill
instructors, recruiters, and MSGs as part of a screening tool
prior to them being accepted for, and reporting to, their
respective schools.
The finding for MOS is also of interest, as those with a
support/administrative MOS had a graduation rate nearly 20
percent higher than that for the infantry/ artillery/
engineering group and more than 3 percent higher than air
wing personnel. However, MOS had no relationship to class
standing. (Novaco et al., 1983, p. 12)
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With regard to personality factors, one area found to be
a contributor to graduation was competitiveness. The
principal instrument used for this measurement was the Jenkins
Activity Survey (JAS) which "assesses the subject's tendency
toward coronary prone or Type A behavior along with providing
an assessment of the three components of Type A behavior.
These consist of speed/impatience, job involvement, and hard-
driving/competitiveness." (Novaco et al . , 1983) In the
military this high score in competitiveness could relate to
many areas, but the ones that first come to mind would be
rank, rifle range, and PFT, all specific characteristics that
I will examine in detail as part of this thesis. Again, this
ties in with results of the MSG studies done by PERSEREC and
CNA wherein high PFT scores were predictors of success at MSG
school. The motivation to excel can easily be linked to an
instinctive competitive drive.
To further support the claims of Sherman et al . (1978),
and Wiskoff et al. (1989), that achievement test scores are
determinants of success, Maskos (1991), though primarily
trying to determine an optimal assignment program of Marine
recruits to occupational training, found that one of the
primary considerations for this placement policy was how an
individual fared on the Area Aptitude Composite (AAC) . The
AAC is linear combinations of the scores a recruit receives in
the basic tests of the Army Area Aptitude Battery. This
battery, which every Marine recruit must pass, tests the
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intellectual, psychic, and motor abilities of the individual.
The AACs are then used to estimate a recruit's success in
follow-on training classes. "A recruit is more likely to
succeed in the training class for which he or she has the
highest proficiency as measured by the AAC . " (Maskos, 1991,
p. 23) In other words, the use of this testing method helps
determine, all other things considered, the occupational field
the Marine will be assigned to and trained in. Again, we see
the use of aptitude tests used as a means to predict success
in school
.
When examining predictors of academic success for graduate
students at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wilson
(1969) found that year of birth was one of the best prognostic
variables. His study, much like the one by Novaco et al
.
(1983) , indicated that the younger students tend to do better.
Perhaps it is because less time has elapsed between their last
formal schooling (undergraduates) and their current schooling
(graduate level); study skills would still be somewhat fresh
as would the knowledge previously learned. Wilson did not
speculate on this phenomena.
Sims (1977) set out to develop a profile of a successful
Marine as a tool to be utilized by the Marine Corps Recruiting
Service. The objective was to assist recruiters in weeding
out potentially unsuccessful recruits. Unfortunately, Sims
could only consider what limited applicant information was
available to recruiters. He concluded that the most
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successful Marines in school are usually those who have
completed high school, enlisted at an early age, and scored
high on the ASVAB mental group composite or the ASVAB
attrition composite. These results do not come as a surprise
based on the results of studies already discussed in this
chapter. Younger Marines and those with higher aptitude test
scores seem to fare the best of all potential school students.
With regard to race, Sims (1977) found that once the
educational level, mental aptitude, and age of a recruit have
been determined, both minority and majority racial groups have
identical chances of success.
D. CIVILIAN ATTRITION AND PREDICTOR STUDIES
Though outside the realm of military-related studies,
considerable work has been done on predicting success in the
civilian academic world. Interestingly enough, some of the
findings carry-over and apply in some areas that will be
examined with the MSG school student. In addition, other
findings report the successful use of biographical /background
questionnaires with perspective students.
Similar to the findings of Sherman et al . (1978), Wiskoff
et al. (1989), and Akst and Quester (1992), in a study of 35
percent of the freshman class at the University of Texas by
Fudge (1970), it was found that biographical data could be
effectively used to predict academic performance. When
coupled with aptitude test scores (Scholastic Aptitude Test
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(SAT) and American College Test (ACT)) a much better estimate
of academic performance could be obtained than through the
commonly used predictive index of high school GPA and aptitude
tests. Thus, the more information available on an individual,
the more accurately success can be predicted. This would
suggest that if an aptitude score such as GT could be used in
conjunction with other background data and the Life
Experiences Questionnaire adopted by Parker et al . (1989) , the
success of a Marine at MSG school could be better predicted.
Self -reporting biographical questionnaires have not been
used much for selection purposes at educational institutions.
There are two basic reasons for this. One, extensive research
using questionnaires as predictors in the academic environment
has been limited; and two, the possibility of some
characteristic in an individual filling out the questionnaire
may already exist that would be a bias, good or bad, in the
selection process for admission.
All of the civilian-related studies I reviewed indicate
that achievement test scores are an excellent
indicator/predictor of success. When these test results are
used in conjunction with previous grades and pertinent





The research reviewed in this chapter has focused
primarily on background characteristics and various testing
programs that can assist users in predicting success in
various military and civilian arenas.
For the most part, the results aren't that surprising. In
all but one analysis (Novaco et al
.
, 1983), achievement test
scores were an indicator of success either on the job, in
school, or in the military. The majority of studies also
showed that age was inversely related to success
.
In each of the three analyses done on MSG school
attrition, PFT and GT scores were found to be predictors of
success. Cutoff scores were chosen for each at which point a
determination could then be made regarding which individuals
were most likely to succeed/ fail from the school. The exact
cutoff scores for each variable differed with each study.
This thesis, using the same data as that used by Akst and
Quester (1992), will take a more indepth look at the same
categories they did, in addition to others, to determine more
specifically where the statistically significant levels of
success are found. The results can then become an additional





Prior to Akst and Quester (1992) , research into predicting
success at MSG school focused primarily on PFT scores, GT
scores, psychological testing, and the use of questionnaires.
The measured effect of these variables on success at the
school may be biased by the omissions of previously unmeasured
variables available in the HMF
.
This chapter is concerned with looking at the selected
sample's composition, and describing the underlying data set.
In addition, the selection of the statistical methods used in
the development of the problem are discussed. Subsequent
chapters are concerned with the discussion of the results and
the conclusions.
The objective of this analysis is to predict success,
which is defined as graduation from the MSG school. Failure,
or attrition from the school, means that the Marine, for
whatever unidentified reason, did not successfully complete
MSG school.
The computational hardware used for this thesis included
the Naval Postgraduate School's IBM 3033 370 mainframe running
an MVS batch system. The software package used for the
analysis was SAS, version 6.07. This program provided an
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informative overview of the large volume of data. There were
over 1800 subjects contained in the data base, with nearly 20
variables to be considered for each subject.
B. DATA ACQUISITION AND ORGANIZATION
The data consist of files requested and received by the
CNA from Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) (POS),
Washington, D.C. and MSG Battalion, Quantico, Virginia, on
fifteen recent MSG classes of sergeants (E-5), corporals (E-
4), and lance corporals (E-3) who reported to MSG Battalion
for school
. These classes were held over a three year period
between December 1989 and September 1991. It was the CNA who
provided the complete data file in ASCII format after
obtaining approval for its release from HQMC and MSG
Battalion. Not all of the variables included in that file
were used for the thesis and some recoding was necessary for
compatibility with the NPS mainframe, the SAS program, and to
ensure the objectives of this thesis are met.
This effort of compiling data began in late 1991 with MSG
Battalion providing HQMC with a file containing the start date
of the previous fifteen classes, along with the name, social
security number (SSN), grade point average (GPA) , and
attrition information (if the Marine did or did not complete
the course) of each Marine enrolled in the course. Thus, the
data were initially broken out by class, but for this study
are analyzed cumulatively.
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This data file was then matched, by SSN, to the HMF . As
a result of this matching, the newly merged data file included
all of the background characteristics listed in Table 6.
These background characteristics, or independent variables,
represent data contained in the HMF subsequent to the start of
each course. Referring back to Chapter III, this is different
from previous MSG studies which looked at data accumulated
after the Marine reported to MSG school. So, this new data
file is the basis for the analysis to determine if any link
exists between success in MSG school and other characteristics
of the individual Marine. When this link is apparent, the
Marine can be described as an "ideal" selection for MSG
school. Table 6 is provided to enable the reader to
understand those variables contained in the HMF and at MSG
school that were available for exploration and examination.
In addition, the variable name utilized and now recognized in
SAS in conjunction with this data set and thesis is listed.
Ultimately, six variables from this list were found to be the
best explanation of success at the MSG school.
There were 1,82 9 SSNs provided by MSG school to HQMC for
those Marines who had attended one of the fifteen classes. Of
these, 1,794 were successfully matched. This disparity of 35
records appears to come from either incorrect entries of SSNs
into the computer or they are students who were recycled into
a later class. Due to the time and difficulty involved in
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trying to investigate which of these alternatives it is, and
because the number represents only about 1.9 percent of the
total records, it was considered not worthwhile to attempt to
correct or locate the missing SSNs for this effort. (Akst and
Quester, 1992) There are also 28 students who were recycled
for indeterminable reasons and for whom it was impossible to
ascertain, given the information provided, whether they
attended another class or not. These were dropped from the
data set. These 28 actually whittled down to 24 since four
were from the 3 5 whose SSNs could not be matched in the HMF
.
As discussed in the next section, females were also dropped
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from the data set due to their relatively small numbers. The
basis then for this analysis is 1737 observations.
With that said however, when an individual characteristic
or variable is examined, more numbers begin to drop off. For
example, if a "0" exists in the field where a PFT score should
be, this is a record that cannot be included in the data set
for analysis. This missing score, number, or letter
fluctuates between variables. So, PFT may show 36 missing
scores, while the variable for rifle score, RIFLESCR, may show
152 missing scores (these are in addition to the 35 records
that initially could not be matched when the MSG school
records and HMF were combined and the 24 Marines who were
recycled)
.
C. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Because MSG duty has gone through periods when women were
both allowed and not allowed to volunteer for the MSG program,
not many women currently are on post. As a result, 3 3 women
attending MSG school over the period of time being analyzed is
quite small (1.8 percent) and not representative enough to
draw any conclusive evidence from regarding their success at
the school versus their male counterpart. Despite this, the
results of their success will be outlined later. Currently,
females are allowed on the duty and further research,
involving more data, may be appropriate to analyze the use of
sex as a further predictive tool for success of females at the
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school. To avoid skewing results, females have been dropped
from the data file.
For the variable RACE, only enough observations were
available for the larger groups to make any separate
statistical inferences on performance at the school. These
groups were labeled as WHITE, BLACK, and HISPANIC. An "other"
category was initially created for American Indians, Alaskan
natives, and those of Pacific or Asian descent. However,
since this group comprised only 1.3 percent of the population,
they were included in the WHITE category.
The PFT scores ranged from zero, where obviously no score
had been input into the HMF by the Marines' former unit, to a
perfect score of 300. The PFT is broken down into first class
(highest), second class, and third class (lowest) categories.
The class a Marine falls into depends on age as shown in Table
7. Requirements become more lenient as one grows older. The










17-26 300-225 224-175 174-135
27-39 300-200 199-150 149-110
40-45 300-175 174-125 124-85
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analysis of PFT scores for this thesis is based on these class
distinctions and will be covered more in-depth in Chapter V.
The rifle score is also broken down into a point system.
In order to qualify with the weapon a Marine must attain a
minimum score of 190. A score of 250 (all bulls eyes) is a
perfect score. To attain the highest level of marksmanship,
classified as expert, a Marine must attain a score between 220
and 250. The designation of sharpshooter is for those with a
score between 210 to 219, and a score between 190 and 209 will
earn the classification of marksman. Again, as for the PFT,
the analysis of success and failure rates at MSG school using
rifle scores is based on these three levels of marksmanship.
Both PFT and rifle score impact directly on a Marines '
s
promotion up to and including the grade of Sergeant (E-5)
.
Thus, a Marine desiring to get promoted will put forth the
extra effort in order to excel and eventually be promoted. It
is apparent then, as discussed in Chapter III why these are
self -motivating measures of success. How far a Marine goes in
his career and how well he does becomes very dependent upon
his desire to perform well in all that he undertakes. Though
the analysis for the PFT and rifle variables was based on
specific class and category cutoffs, other cutoffs were
examined and will also be discussed.
Since there is generally a relationship between MOSs
within occupational fields, MOSs were coded so that all those
beginning with the same two numbers were part of one
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occupational field. Occupational field (occfield) is in fact
how the Marine Corps assigns its monitors, known as occfield
sponsors. For instance, a monitor having cognizance over
Marines in the "01" occfield will make assignments for all
Marines in MOSs 0121, 0131, 0141, 0151, 0161, and 0193 . These
are all administrative MOSs. After individual MOSs were coded
into occfields, the attrition rates were examined. Because
some occfields contained as little as one individual, it was
impractical to look at attrition rates by occfield in all
cases
.
Due to the small size of some of the occfields, I took the
MOS issue a step further by placing the occfields into
categories that were descriptive of their mission and which






3 Combat Service Support
4. Aviation Support;
Further discussion and an analysis of the MOS variable in this
context can be found in Chapter V.
A number of the variables contained in the HMF are closely
related and were, not surprisingly, found to be highly
correlated. The measure of this correlation was accomplished
using correlation tables, the variance inflation factor (VIF)
,
and collinearity functions in the SAS program as described in
52
SAS Institute Inc. (1990) . I suspected that the TIS, TIG,
current age, age entered USMC, and grade variables would be
correlated with each other to some degree. It was then a
matter of determining where the highest correlation existed
and discarding variables that had little to no explanatory
value from the initial model in order to derive the final and
best explanatory model of success at the school . High VIFs
(over five) helped identify and whittle the number of these
variables down.
Should this particular data set be examined further, the
only other variable of question and worth discussing was
DROPFLAG21. This was created at the request of the CNA to
examine those Marines who had dropped from MSG school within
the first 21 days of reporting to the school. They thought
that the reason for Marines dropping within such a short
period of time perhaps was not due to anything at the school,
but due to poor screening by the previous command who had,
because of this poor screening, sent an unqualified Marine to
the school. This thesis does not examine the DROPFLAG
variable since the CNA found there was no basis for this
assumption
.
All other variables and background characteristics to be
analyzed require no specific discussion since they are
relatively self explanatory. In addition, the Marine has
little control over these variables once at the point of
applying for MSG duty. The only exceptions to this would be
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the ASVAB which is based on a test that can be retaken every
six months in order to improve the scores, and the education
level which can be increased through off duty education or
correspondence courses.
D. STATISTICAL METHOD UTILIZED
Initially, regression analysis was performed and frequency
tables and correlation tables were created with SAS for all
variables in the HMF . This was done to check coefficient
signs (positive or negative) to see if they were what was
expected, to look at the total categorical numbers, and to
ensure that any coding done for the variables in the HMF was
correct and understood. No glaring complications arose from
this .
The selection of the logistic procedure to analyze the
data set was a logical choice since it fits linear regression
models for binary or ordinary response data. It also gives a
more precise picture of results than simple regression when
using multiple independent variables. Since this study deals
with success or failure at MSG school, these are referred to
as binary response variables (a choice of two variables)
.
Logistic regression is a procedure that has come to be
accepted in most social science disciplines as the correct
methodology when one wishes to perform regression analysis
with dichotomous dependent variables, such as whether an
individual succeeded or failed at school. (Studenmund, 1992)
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In contrast to ordinary regression which models the data to a
line, logistic regression models the data as an s-shaped
curve. The logit model was created to correct a major problem
in the linear probability model, wherein some predictions will
fall outside the parameters of the linear probability model.
This means that predictions will be less than zero or greater
than one. The logit model thus needed to be used to correct
for this deficiency. The model transforms the problem of
predicting the probabilities within a (0,1) interval to the
problem of predicting odds of an event occurring within the
range of the actual value and closer to the actual value than
the probit model as you move further away from the middle of
the curve or . 5 . A further discussion of binary response
methodology and the logistic procedure and logit model can be
found in Studenmund (1992) and Cox and Snell (1989) .
The logit model for this thesis is defined as:
1P {Success at MSG School) = . .
„
I + e -'V°
x
«
+ M, + ... + iw
where P is the probability that an individual will graduate
from MSG school and e is the base of the natural logarithm
(approximately equal to 2.718) . The Xs are the values of the
explanatory variables, the betas, or Bs, are the values of the
estimated parameter or coefficients of the model, and k
denotes the number of explanatory variables measured for each
individual. The value of the dependent variable "GRAD2" was
interpreted as the probability of success at the MSG school
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when used in conjunction with variables from the HMF as a
basis for this success.
The logistic procedure of the SAS program was originally
designed for the medical community to identify anomalies. For
this reason it was set up by ordered value, wherein "1" is the
anomaly, and "2" is the most common occurrence. For this
thesis, as in most applications in the business world, the
ordered value lists the success as the "1" and failure as the
"2". In order to do this with the logistic procedure in SAS
the DROPFLAG variable merely needed to be renamed GRAD and
recoded for my use as GRAD 2 . This was the only difficulty, if
it can even be classified as such, that was experienced with
the use of the logistic procedure.
Stepwise regression is often used when trying to predict
success or failure with multiple variables. Due to the
relatively small amount of variables being examined for use in
this thesis model, I elected to use stepwise regression only
after all other methods of comparison had been utilized so
that I would avoid being swayed by these results. These
methods and tests used included determining which variables I
thought would work best in predicting success at the school,
in addition to the VIF, classification table (CTABLE) , Durbin-
Watson (DW) , regression, collinearity (COLLIN) , correlation,
and frequency options. As it turned out, the stepwise
procedure identified the same variables I had previously
selected using the methods mentioned, for the best explanation
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of the data, that is, those variables with the highest
statistical significance.
Additionally, in further assessing the model for fit, the
log likelihood test demonstrated a probability of .0001,
indicating the variables used significantly explained the
graduation/non-graduation rate attained at MSG school.
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V. PRESENTATION OF DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
Utilizing the variables discussed in Chapter IV, this
chapter presents the results of the statistical procedures
produced through the use of the SAS program. Again, the
objective is to determine which independent variables best
explain success at MSG school and will ultimately comprise the
explanatory variables in this prediction model. The variable
GRAD2 which was coded to list all those who graduated from MSG
school as a "0" and those who failed as a "1", is the
dependent variable.
Frequency tables gave an initial and sometimes interesting
perspective of this issue. This step ensured enough
observations were available in all areas and gave a feel for
the information the model might include. These frequencies
are listed and discussed for many of the variables,
particularly those whose numbers were too small to use as a
basis for any analysis. GRAD2 was also plotted against each
of the independent variables to determine actual graduation
and non-graduation rates.
Correlation tables were created for all independent
variables to determine if and where correlation problems
existed. These problems were systematically dealt with
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through the careful elimination of variables from the model
until only a couple of understandably correlated variables
were left. Tables are contained and a further discussion is
covered in this chapter.
Lastly, as a culmination to all of this analysis and of
the logistic procedure, the best predictive model available
from the data and variables used will be presented. A base
case, using means and coefficient values, is computed and
provided as an example for future applications.
B. ANALYSIS OF VARIABLE FREQUENCIES NOT USED IN THE MODEL
Once the data were converted from ASCII to a usable form
for SAS, the first thing accomplished was listing frequencies
for all of the variables available. Foremost was taking a
look at the overall graduation and non-graduation rates.
Table 8 outlines the numbers and indicates that the attrition
rate from the fifteen MSG classes is 36.5 percent from the
school. This appears to be an unusually high percentage of
the student population that fail the school. The key to this
would be to know exactly what the reasons were for these
failures. The first thought is that the high attrition is due
to the demanding rigors of the course. It could also be that
previous commands have conducted poor screening of the
potential MSG and he is found not qualified once he has
reported to the school . Actual attrition for problems once
the Marine has begun the course may be small. Unfortunately,
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Table 8. OVERALL GRADUATION AND NON-GRADUATION RATES
NUMBER PERCENTAGE
GRADUATE 1104 63 .55%
NON-GRADUATE 633 36.45%
TOTAL 1737 100.0%
the reasons for failure from the school were not provided by
MSG school for this study, though these records are maintained
for each class
.
Variables not used as part of the final predictive model
include those in Table 9. Some of these are worth elaborating
on, others are not. The class average is not relevant since
the data file carried only a class average for those Marines
who actually graduated from the school. None of the other
variables provided by MSG school were utilized for analysis.
A discussion of the other variables follows.
The Marine Corps breaks down education level into twelve
distinct categories. Of these, recipients of high school
diplomas constitute 93.1 percent of this group, while the only
other groups above one percent were those with a high school
certificate of attendance (2.4 percent) and those with a
general equivalency diploma (one percent) . With such a small
percentage in each of these other eleven categories, a closer
analysis did not seem warranted.
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Table 9 . VARIABLES FROM THE HMF NOT USED IN THE PREDICTIVE
MODEL
PRIMARY MOS (MOS) MARITAL STATUS
CURRENT ENLISTMENT TIME IN SERVICE (TIS)
LENGTH OF ENLISTMENT MSG SCHOOL CLASS AVG
.
EDUCATION LEVEL AGE ENTERED USMC
ASVAB SCORES - ELCIAR, MMMAPA, CL
With regard to ASVAB testing, the portion of this battery
of tests used with the most consistency for qualification to
different jobs, programs or MOSs, is the GT. (See Appendix A)
There is a minimum GT score requirement of 90 for admittance
to the MSG program. Since no other part of the ASVAB tests
are used with relation to MSGs they have not been evaluated.
GT score was found to be a significant predictor of success at
MSG school and will be discussed later.
The ethnic variable contains sixteen different and
distinct categories. The largest, constituting 90.1 percent,
claimed they were not a part of any specific ethnic group.
Only two other groups of this sixteen had numbers above one
percent of the population, Puerto Ricans at 1.3 percent and
those with Mexican ancestry at 4.3 percent. Since so few
claimed ethnicity outside of the "none" category and because
the race variable was analyzed and found to be statistically
significant at the ten percent level, further research of the
ethnic background characteristic was not considered
warranted.
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So many of the variables had the potential to suffer from
multicollinearity that it was imperative to determine, if
given a choice between two variables, which was the easiest or
most readily available to use and understand. Such was the
case with the variables that delineated current age and the
age at which the individual entered the Marine Corps . I opted
to use current age since that was the most readily available
information to the user. In addition, and very important in
this process of excluding variables, the age at which the
individual entered the Marine Corps was not a significant
explanatory variable when measured statistically. In the end,
the current age variable, AGE, proved to be a correct choice,
as it was found to be statistically significant at the one
percent level in predicting success and will be discussed
later
.
Until some multicollinearity problems began to surface,
length of service was a variable that was a candidate for
inclusion into the predictive model. It is so closely
correlated to characteristics such as age and grade though
that it was necessary to omit it while eliminating as much
bias as possible. Be that as it may, it is interesting to
observe, as seen in Table 10, that those Marines currently on
a five year enlistment contract fared better than all others
with an attrition rate of 25.77 percent; that is nearly 11
percent less than the overall rate. In fact, upon further
examination Marines, on the two longest enlistment contracts
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offered had the best chance of success at MSG school. The
bulk of the enlistment lengths are four years and these
Marines failed school at a rate three percent higher that the
overall rate of 36.45 percent.
Table 10. LENGTH OF CURRENT ENLISTMENT (IN YEARS)
FREQUENCIES BY GRADUATE AND NON-GRADUATE































Whether a Marine was on his first second, or subsequent
enlistment had no substantial bearing on the non-graduation
rate. The non-graduation percentages were as follows: on
first enlistment - 37.60 percent; on second enlistment - 36.05
percent; and on third or more enlistment - 36.0 percent. This
variable was not utilized.
For a number of the variables it becomes immediately clear
that some of their categories did not have enough observations
from which to base any analysis on. For instance, only 33 of
the 1770 Marines analyzed for this thesis were females. This
represents 1.9 percent of the total population hardly, on the
surface, a large enough figure to use as a basis for any
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conclusive statements. For comparison purposes, Table 11
outlines total male and female numbers along with the
graduation and non-graduation rates. Female attrition rates
run nine percent higher than the males. Again though, it is





















difficult to pinpoint a specific cause. As indicated in
Chapter IV, because of the small population of females, they
were dropped from the data set for the purposes of this thesis
analysis
.
A quick look at the marital status category using Table 12
shows the overwhelming majority of MSG students, as expected,
are single. Not surprisingly then, a failure rate of 36.43
percent coincides closely with the overall school attrition
rate of 3 6.45 percent. Divorced Marines showed only a
slightly lower failure rate of 35.90 percent. Though there
should have been no married Marines in this file, the data
indicate a total of six. This can probably be attributed to
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Table 12 . MARITAL STATUS FREQUENCIES BY GRADUATE AND NON-
GRADUATE





























either careless input of information or a failure on the
Marines ' s part to provide a copy of a final divorce decree to
the administration office so that his record can be
updated.
Dependency was also given a cursory look. Table 13 breaks
this down into those having one, two, or three dependents.
The problem I encountered looking at this information
initially was that the file was missing hundreds of
observations when queried as to how many dependents an
individual had. As a result, I had to create a dummy variable
so that all those names reflecting a blank field in this
category meant zero dependents. The basis for this assumption
was that the administration office entering the information
probably left the field blank thinking this was the same as
zero. The final numbers appear to be a valid reflection of
what would be expected. Due to the expected high numbers of
Marines with zero dependents, the non-graduation rate closely
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mirrors that of the overall rate. Though the other
categories, those with one and two dependents, are at least
interesting to present and look at, the small number of
Table 13 . DEPENDENT FREQUENCIES BY GRADUATE AND NON-GRADUATE























observations does not lend itself to being used as one of the
criteria for admission to the school
.
Through various means of testing to be discussed later,
time in service (TIS) and time in grade (TIG) proved to be two
variables that were highly correlated and thus had to be dealt
with. Since TIG was of a much greater statistical
significance than TIS, the latter was not used in the final
predictive model. Table 14 is provided to show how I broke up
TIS initially and then how the graduate and non-graduate rates
fell out. Those Marines with between two and five years (25
to 72 months) of service appear to graduate at a higher rate
than the other year groups utilized. Of course, this TIS can
be broken up and analyzed in any manner the user cares to.
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Table 14 is the most clear cut for the purposes of this
thesis
.
Table 14. TIME IN SERVICE (TIS) (IN MONTHS) FREQUENCIES BY
GRADUATE AND NON-GRADUATE


















































As described in Chapter IV, the primary military
occupational specialty (MOS) was recoded and analyzed for
significance and to identify trends in a couple of ways.
Without much elaboration, Table 15 breaks down graduate and
non-graduate rates and numbers by occfield. Some of the
occfields include as few as two observations, whereas others
such as 0300 (infantry) and 2500 (communications) contain a
large portion of the population. (See Appendix B for occfield
descriptions.) It is interesting to note here though that
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Table 15. MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL FIELD (OCCFIELD)
FREQUENCIES BY GRADUATE AND NON-GRADUATE
r-i + i—i i—
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the next three of the largest four occfields (in numbers of
observations) have very high attrition rates from the school
though no link is initially obvious: 01 - 46.15 percent, 30 -
45.45 percent, and 35 - 49.60 percent. Because of the small
number of observations within some of the occfields, I grouped
the occfields together by mission to see if any one of these
categories showed any graduation or non-graduation trends.
Table 16 delineates which MOSs were grouped together, while
Table 17 outlines the graduation and non-graduation rates of
the MSG school Marines within these categories.
Table 16. ASSIGNMENT OF SPECIFIC OCCFIELDS TO MISSION
CATEGORIES
COMBAT ARMS - 03, 08, 18
COMBAT SUPPORT - 02, 13, 25, 26, 57, 58
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT - 01, 04, 11, 14, 21, 23, 28, 30,
31, 33, 34, 35, 40, 43, 44, 46,
55
AVIATION SUPPORT LOGISTICS - 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 68,
70, 72
The effect of the high 01, 30, and 35 occfield attrition
rates is reflected in the combat service support category.
What is interesting in Table 17 is to see that the combat arms
MOSs, where traditionally a larger number of Marines with
lower GTs are present than other occfields, graduate at a
higher rate than the other three categories.
Because MOSs are monitored so closely to ensure they
remain balanced, it would be almost impossible, and certainly
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unfair to the individual Marine, to offer MSG duty only to
certain MOSs or in certain percentages to MOSs . Thus,
recruitment to MSG duty in this manner is not desirable and
was not included in the model.
C. ANALYSIS OF VARIABLE FREQUENCIES USED IN THE MODEL
Based on previous MSG school attrition studies (Akst and
Quester, 1992; Wiskoff, et al . , 1989), it was logical to
assume that PFT, rifle, and GT scores would probably be among
those variables or background characteristics that best
predicted success at MSG school and would thus be included in
the final predictive model. That assumption proved to be
correct
.
In addition, the variables age, grade, race, and TIG were
found to be predictors of success at a statistically
significant level at the school. Table 18 provides a
definition and discussion of these variables.
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Table 18. DEFINITION AND DISCUSSION OF VARIABLES USED IN
THE MODEL
PFTSCORE - represents actual PFT scores held in the HMF
for Marines in this data file; scores were missing from
twelve records. The positive coefficient sign indicated
the probability of success at MSG school increased as the
PFT score increased.
RIFLESCR -represents actual rifle scores held in the HMF
for Marines in this data file; scores were missing from
126 records. The positive coefficient sign indicated the
probability of success at MSG school increased as the
rifle score increased.
GTVE - computation of selected scores from the ASVAB that
comprise the General Technical or GT of a Marine; scores
were missing from 20 records. The positive coefficient
sign indicated the probability of success at MSG school
increased as the GT score increased.
AGE - reflects the current age of Marines in this data
file; all records contained an age. The negative
coefficient sign indicated the probability of success at
MSG school decreased as age increased.
RACE - broken down into WHITE , BLACK , AND HISPANIC , it is
the respective race for those Marines in this data file;
WHITE was used as the base case for this dummy variable
since it represented the most observations of the three;
all records contained a race code. The negative
coefficient for both BLACK and HISPANIC indicated the
probability of success was less than that of a white
person
.
TIG - represents the number of months a Marine in the data
file has spent in that grade; TIG information was missing
from nineteen records. The positive coefficient sign
indicated the probability of success increased as the
number of months TIG increased.
After these seven background characteristics were
determined to be the best independent variables for the model,
it was interesting, but more importantly imperative, to
determine at what point cutoffs needed to be established to
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identify the most likely MSG school graduate. Frequencies
were run on each of the categories to help establish this.
For PFT score, it seemed logical to first divide the
scores into each of the three classes already established by
the Marine Corps for this variable - first class (score of
225-300), second class (score of 175-224), and third class
(score of 135-174) . Table 19 contains the results. It is
apparent that those Marines with PFT scores less than 225
points fail to graduate from MSG school in proportions well
above 50 percent, but that the number in this category is only
about 8.5 percent of the observations. Of course, it is
Table 19 . PFT CLASS FREQUENCIES BY GRADUATE AND NON-GRADUATE

























NOTE: 12 scores were missi ng from the data file.
unrealistic that the Marine Corps only accept Marines
possessing a first class PFT into the MSG program.
Thus, first class scores were broken down further into
scores outlined in Table 20. These figures are provided for
comparison and use later when trying to determine the optimum
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PFT score for selection to MSG school. As expected, the
higher a PFT score, the more likely the individual is to
graduate from the school
.
Table 20. SELECTED PFT SCORE CUTOFFS BY GRADUATE AND NON-
GRADUATE





















The rifle score (qualification is with an M16A2 rifle) is
another variable that lent itself to division by category. In
the Marine Corps, rifle scores are delineated by expert (score
of 220-250), sharpshooter (SS) (score of 210-219), and
marksman (MM) (190-209) . A fourth category, unqualified
(UNQ) , was established for those scoring less than 190 points
on the rifle range. Table 21 provides a breakout of these
marksmanship levels into graduate and non-graduate rates.
Except for the unqualified category the graduation rates
decrease as rifle scores decrease. But again, the MSG program
cannot limit itself to only taking those who qualify as an
expert on the rifle range. For further analysis and use
cutoffs were reestablished with no regard to category. These
are listed in Table 22 . Just as seen when broken into
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Table 21. RIFLE CATEGORY FREQUENCIES BY GRADUATE AND NON-
GRADUATE































NOTE : 126 scores were missing from the data file
Table 22. SELECTED RIFLE SCORE CUTOFFS BY GRADUATE AND NON-
GRADUATE



























categories (Table 21), graduation rates decrease as rifle
scores decrease. Again, this information is provided for use
later in helping to establish the optimum model for selection
to MSG school
.
The GT score is not divided into classifications or
categories. It is the only variable used in the model that
has an established cutoff for selection to the MSG program,
that is, a score of 90. In relation to this, an individual
must have a score of 80 to gain entry into the Marine Corps,
while a 110 GT is required for application to the warrant
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officer program, and a 120 score is required for application
to any commissioned officer program. Table 23 provides a
comparison of different arbitrarily established cutoffs for GT
and their graduation and non-graduation rates. Graduation
rates increase as the GT score increases. What is
interesting, and to some degree alarming, is the whopping 50
percent failure rate from MSG school when the GT score minimum
is waived to accept a Marine with a GT of less than 90.
Wiskoff et . al . (1989), first noted this same pattern and
Table 23. SELECTED GT SCORE CUTOFFS BY GRADUATE AND NON-
GRADUATE






































recommended that no waivers be given for GT score. However,
this recommendation was not heeded and the trend continues.
Even those with a GT of less than 95 have an unacceptably high
attrition rate of almost 48 percent.
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Though the program cannot accept only the high-end GT
score applicants, neither can it afford to take the low-end
candidates. However, the exact answer becomes even more
muddled when we see that even those with a GT between 100 and
110 (not shown in Table 23) fail the school at a rate of 39
percent. In addition, the commander of a Marine who really
wants to be on MSG duty but continues to come up just short of
the prerequisites probably does not want, nor perhaps should
he have, the commander's discretion of requesting a waiver
taken away from him. He is the one who observes the Marine on
a daily basis and knows better than anyone whether the Marine
has the skills to succeed at MSG school. The commander
certainly will not stick his reputation on the line if he
doesn't believe in the Marine because he doesn't want to make
himself look bad in the process.
The ASVAB test can be retaken once every six months and
remedial education is available for the Marine who has the
potential, albeit his GT score, to do well at MSG school and
ultimately on the program. Utilizing the GT as a measure of
success, the Marine Corps must look hard at the numbers herein
and somehow do a better job at selecting Marines for admission
to MSG school.
Age is another decidedly arbitrary category from which to
base selection to MSG school, but one which is statistically
significant at the ten percent level. Table 24 shows how I
elected to look at this variable. In this picture, except for
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those in the outlying group of 26 years of age and older, we
can see that the younger a Marine is the less likely he is to
graduate from MSG school. However, it is worth noting that
when examining ages by individual year there is no consistency
or trend with regard to graduate and non-graduate rates.
Table 24 . CURRENT AGE FREQUENCIES BY GRADUATE AND NON-GRADUATE































These rates fluctuate by age. Only when segregated into age
groups that closely resemble the grade which an individual has
achieved by that age, as I have done in Table 24, do we see
any trend. Though difficult to pinpoint exactly why the
younger Marine experiences higher attrition, the issue of
maturity is a possible cause. For example, we have an older
Marine (22-25 years old) who has, as we shall see next,
probably attained the rank of E4, been in the Marine Corps for
awhile, lived through many experiences, and has set as another
goal, to become an MSG. He is goal-oriented and knows exactly
what he wants to do. The younger Marine, probably an E3 , is
still going through stages of immaturity and is not quite sure
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quite sure what he wants or whether he'll even stay in the
Marine Corps, while the oldest Marines, perhaps, just can't
seem to find their niche.
The original variable GRADE was broken down through the
use of dummy variables using the separate variable categories
of E3 , E4, and E5 . Based on that, and as seen and discussed
previously with the age variable, it is no surprise that as
Table 25 shows, E3s and E5s failure rate from MSG school is
much higher than that for E4s . Utilizing this information,
perhaps consideration should be given to accepting a higher
number of E4s while decreasing the number of E3s and E5s
Table 25. GRADE FREQUENCIES BY GRADUATE AND NON-GRADUATE

























selected for the school. A 40 percent attrition rate for E3s,
to the naked eye, seems quite high. Answering the question
why, may be the first step.
Race was divided into three distinct categories to
determine the effect, if any, and relation to graduation
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rates. Again, anyone other than a black or hispanic was
considered white as explained in Chapter IV. Table 26 shows
that whites graduate from MSG school at a higher rate than
Table 26. RACE FREQUENCIES BY GRADUATE AND NON-GRADUATE

























non-whites. Quite alarming is the hispanic attrition rate of
almost 50 percent. Unfortunately, it is difficult to
ascertain exactly, without more information from MSG school,
what the cause of failure from the school was . It is easy to
speculate that educational background is the cause of this
academic failure. However, this may not be the case. Some
attention should be given to researching the cause so
appropriate action can be taken if, and where necessary, to
correct the situation. If it is relevant, the Marine Corps
may also want to look at whether the numbers by respective
race on the MSG program are representative of the numbers by
race in the entire Marine Corps.
Since there is no magical cutoff for the amount of months
a Marine spends in grade in the grades being analyzed, I
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elected to simply look at the TIG variable in twelve month
increments. Table 27 outlines these results. Those Marines
contained in the data file with less than twelve months, or
Table 27. TIME IN GRADE (TIG) FREQUENCIES BY GRADUATE AND
NON-GRADUATE







































NOTE Nineteen records were missing from the data file
.
one year, TIG regardless of grade, fail to graduate from MSG
school nearly 42 percent of the time. This rate appears quite
high. When a Marine has between one and four years (13 to 48
months) TIG, that rate drops to below 34 percent and then
increases again when TIG is greater than four years. These
results tie in somewhat nicely with the findings for age and
grade previously discussed. The majority of the time a Marine
applying to the MSG program in the grade of E3 will most
likely be promoted before he has 12 months TIG. Thus, it is
E4s and E5s who are most likely to have more than 12 months
TIG. With graduation rates higher in the 13 to 48 month TIG
category, the link can then be seen through the higher
graduation rate of E4s than E3s.
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D. CORRELATION AND MULTICOLLINEARITY
1. Multicollinearity
Imperfect multicollinearity, which is what is
typically meant when the word multicollinearity is used, is a
linear relationship between two or more independent variables
that is so strong that it can significantly affect the
estimation of the equation. For more on this theoretical and
sample phenomenon see Studenmund (1992). Multicollinearity
exists in virtually every data set to one degree or another.
The question to be answered then is how severe is the
multicollinearity in a given sample and will the results be
biased by not dealing with it (i.e., leaving it as is) or will
the results be skewed by manipulating it (i.e., dropping
variables ) .
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is a method of testing
this severity. A high VIF, generally considered greater than
five, indicates multicollinearity has increased the estimated
variance of the estimated coefficient yielding a decreased t-
score. Further discussion of VIFs can be found again in
Studenmund (1992) and SAS Institute, vol.2 SAS/STAT (1991).
A VIF test was initially conducted on all of the data
set variables. Three were above five - age, age at entry into
the Marine Corps, and TIS. Age at entry into the Marine Corps
was discarded because I thought it was too closely correlated
with grade, TIS, and TIG. After this, only one variable, TIG,
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had a VIF above five, while four variables had a VIF of around
two, and one variable, E5, had a VIF of three. Upon deleting
TIS, three variables remained with a VIF of two - age, E5, and
those on their first enlistment. Since enlistment lengths and
the enlistment number the Marine is currently on are closely
associated with age and grade, I decided to delete these two
variables from the model. This left the variables described
at length in section C. All variable VIFs used in the final
model were below two except for age which recorded a 2.05.
This would appear to indicate a good fit with little
unexplained variation. A further examination should, if the
model is defined properly, verify this. The key to this whole
process was whittling down the variables to a manageable, yet
accurate, number wherein the user would not be overwhelmed by
too many and perhaps vague variables to use for a prediction
computation. Deleting variables is a sensitive area, since
one must be careful not to discard any variables that possess
significant explanatory power.
2. Correlation
A rule of thumb used by statisticians (Studenmund,
1992) is that a correlation coefficient in excess of .50
generally implies serial correlation is present in the
equation. This correlation exists when two or more variables
are attempting to explain the same information. The
correlation coefficients for this model are shown in Table 28.
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Only two areas fall into this category of concern. They are
the relationship between TIG and age, defined by a correlation
Table 28. TABLE OF PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
GRAD2 PFTSCORE RIFLESCR GTVE AGE E4 E5 BLACK HISPANIC TIG
GRAD2 1.00000 -0.20411 -0.11767 -0.12607 0.04219 -0.08319 -0.00410 0.08323 0.06591 -0.05854
PFTSCORE -0.20411 1.00000 0.09811 0.00301 -0.03684 0.11055 -0.02195 0.04210 0.00282 0.00572
RIFLESCR -0.11767 0.09811 1.00000 0.17801 0.10677 0.15155 0.10600 -0.12857 -0.02487 0.09008
GTVE -0.12607 0.00301 0.17801 1.00000 -0.01539 0.05453 -0.01023 -0.34328 -0.06385 0.05532
AGE 0.04219 -0.03684 0.10677 -0.01539 1.00000 0.13677 0.52480 0.09440 -0.01773 0.49971
E4 -0.08319 0.11055 0.15155 0.05453 0.13677 1.00000 -0.29724 0.01048 -0.00728 0.01512
E5 -0.00410 -0.02195 0.10600 -0.01023 0.52480 -0.29724 1.00000 0.06455 -0.02668 0.23224
BLACK 0.08323 0.04210 -0.12857 -0.34328 0.09440 0.01048 0.06455 1.00000 -0.12413 0.03826
HISPANIC 0.06591 0.00282 -0.02487 -0.06385 -0.01773 -0.00728 -0.02668 -0.12413 1.00000 -0.04765
TIG -0.05854 0.00572 0.09008 0.05532 0.49971 0.01512 0.23224 0.03826 -0.04765 1.00000
are defined at a .52 correlation rate. Both are close to the
established cutoff of .50. It is easy to see why they would
be correlated. Most Marines are E5s by a certain age since
the bulk of them are eighteen and nineteen years old upon
entry. This spills over into also having roughly the same
amount of months TIG by a given age.
To ensure there was little unexplained serial
correlation on the model proposed in Section C, a test known
as the Durbin-Watson (DW) (see Studenmund, 1992) was conducted
using all of these variables. The Durbin-Watson test utilizes
a formula that produces the D-statistic. If the D-Statistic
equals zero there is extreme positive correlation; if the D-
statistic equals four there is extreme negative serial
correlation present; and if the D-statistic equals two no
serial correlation is present. For this model, the D-
statistic equalled 1.923, considered very close to two and
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indicative of no serial correlation. Thus, through the proper
use of testing and analysis serial correlation does not appear
to be a problem or prevalent in this model.
E. ANALYSIS OF THE PREDICTIVE MODEL
Table 2 9 lists those variables, which were determined by
various statistical methods within SAS and mentioned in
Sections A and C of this chapter, that comprise the model that
is most apt to predict success at MSG school. This is based
on the data file used for this thesis and the methodology
used. Though the statistical significance level may change
slightly over time, the variables will probably not change
since the data covered a long period of time. Only if new
variables are considered or requirements for selection to the
school change will these variables likely change. The
intercept is the dependent variable identified as success or
graduation from MSG school and labeled as "GRAD2" in the
computer program. The remaining variables in Table 29 are
independent variables from the HMF . The coefficient values
for each of these are derived as a result of weighting these
variables against each other in the logit model. The
coefficient thus indicates the probability of change for that
particular variable based on one increment of change for that
same variable in the logit model . A few examples are
warranted for understanding.
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Table 29. VARIABLE COEFFICIENTS, STANDARD ERRORS, AND
PROBABILITY VALUES
STANDARD CHI -SQUARE
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT ERROR PROBABILITY
INTERCEPT -4.8167 1.3348 0.0003
PFTSCORE 0.0157 0.00205 0.0001
RIFLESCR 0.0103 0.00441 0.0200
GTVE 0.0141 0.00536 0.0086
AGE -0.1343 0.0312 0.0001
E4 0.4695 0.1311 0.0003
E5 0.6099 0.2424 0.0119
BLACK -0.3789 0.1440 0.0085
HISPANIC -0.4443 0.2360 0.0598
TIG 0.0208 0.00527 0.0001
Examp 1 e 1 . Since the PFTSCORE coefficient is positive this
says the probability of success at MSG school will increase
.0157 percent as the actual PFT score increases one point.
Hence, the higher the PFT score, the more likely a Marine is
to graduate from school.
Example 2 . The negative coefficient sign for AGE indicates
that for each one year increase in age the probability of
success at MSG school decreases .1343 percent. Hence, the
older a Marine is the less likely he is to complete MSG
school
.
Example 3 . The probability of an E4 graduating from MSG
school is .4695 percent more likely than an E3 (base case)
.
Example 4
. The negative coefficient sign for HISPANIC
indicates that the probability of an HISPANIC graduating from
MSG school is .4443 percent less likely than a WHITE (base
case)
.
Example 5 . The positive coefficient sign for TIG indicates
that for each additional month a Marine spends in grade the
probability that he will graduate from MSG school increases
. 0208 percent
.
When discussing these percentage increase and decrease
probabilities remember that these were calculated to reflect
the effect and impact of the particular variable only when
used in conjunction with the other variables in the logit
model. When analyzed separately, the probabilities may look
quite different.
The chi-square probability value in Table 29 indicates
that all variables are statistically significant at the ten
percent level. More ideally all but one (HISPANIC) are
significant at the five percent level, and most ideally all
but three (HISPANIC, E5 , and RIFLESCR) are significant at the
one percent level
.
By plugging a base case set of probability values into the
logit model (explained in Chapter IV) the probability of a
particular person having success at MSG school with certain
characteristics can be calculated. The best way to
demonstrate this effect is through the use of examples.
Case 1 . In this equation, a base case, that is those
variables listed in Table 29, is established using the means
for the respective variables. Recall that WHITE and E3 are
the base case variables for race and grade respectively,
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established through the use of dummy variables. Thus, the
equation and calculations look like this:
c = -4.8167 + .0157(263.55) + .0103(215.77) +.0141(109.14)
INTERCEPT PFTSCORE RIFLESCR GTVE




P (Success at MSG School) = 1 tn . nn = .6169447 = 61.7%
1 + p - < • 476006)
So, the probability of success for a white Marine, E3 , age
22.43 years, with a PFT score of 263.55, a rifle score of
215.77, a GT score of 109.14, and 19.52 months TIG is 61.69
percent
.





TIG-3 6 MONTHS GRADE-E3
Using the logit formula as demonstrated in Case 1, the
probability of success for this Marine at MSG school is
computed at 78.86 percent. Explained another way, the effect
on this Marine with the above characteristics and information
succeeding at MSG school is increased by 78.86 - 61.69 = 17.17
percent, in comparison to the Marine in Case 1.
Case 3 . A Marine possesses the same background information as
Case 2 except this Marine is black. Thus, when -.3789 is
added to the equation the resultant probability of success is
calculated to be 71.87 percent. This means the effect on this
Marine succeeding at MSG school is decreased by 78.86 - 71.87
= 6.9 9 percent when compared to the Marine in Case 2.
Case 4 . Probably one of the best models created, but




TIG-42 MONTHS GRADE -E4
When calculated, this individual has a probability of
succeeding at MSG school of 90.43 percent; that's less than a
ten percent attrition rate. The effect on this Marine
succeeding at school is increased by 90.43 - 61.69 = 28.74
percent in comparison to the Case 1 Marine. Again though,
these scores are exceedingly high and it would be unrealistic,
not to mention impossible, to find enough Marines to limit
qualifications to those of this case. The case is only
presented as an example to demonstrate to what extreme the
variables in this model would have to be in order to cut
attrition to a level of 10 percent.
Case 5 . Perhaps the most practical case of those illustrated,
wherein attrition is held under 30 percent, is the one of a
Marine with the following background characteristics:
PFTSCORE-275 AGE-21 RACE-WHITE
RIFLESCR-210 GT-105
TIG-2 4 MONTHS GRADE-E4
The probability of this Marine succeeding at school is 78.46
percent. If the race is changed to BLACK, the probability of
success decreases 7.09 percent to 71.37 percent. If the race
is changed to HISPANIC, the probability of success decreases
8.44 percent to 70.02 percent. Even with these decreases in
the probability of success the attrition rate still remains
below 30 percent in comparison to the 36.45 percent rate
computed from the actual data used for this thesis.
Obviously, the probability of success is dependent on the
background characteristics of each individual considered for
MSG school. This probability can be determined with some
accuracy by plugging the required information into the logit
model as demonstrated.
There is a method available in the SAS computer package
that will save the time of hand calculating the probability
results, but the initial information still must be input to
the computer for each individual case. It should be possible
to develop an interface program that will go into the data
base and key on one variable such as SSN and then read the
requested data for that individual into the logit program and
calculate the required probability.
Thus, selected background characteristics must be analyzed
for each Marine since the probabilities of success can deviate
from each other quite a bit. Because of the current high
attrition rate and the associated costs of this attrition, it
is important that a more thorough scrutiny of these applicants




A probability model has now been defined using select
background characteristics of an individual that will help
determine who the best candidates are for selection and
ultimately graduation from MSG school. This approach, in and
of itself, would be fine if we lived in a "perfect world."
Unfortunately, this is not the case. Thus, when examining
this issue of trying to predict success at MSG school while at
the same time lowering the attrition rate, it is not realistic
to look strictly at data that a computer generates. Instead,
other issues, which I refer to as non-data factors, must also
be examined and included in any decision regarding assignment
to MSG school. These factors include, but are not limited to:
the role of the commanding officer, the level of desire the
Marine has to be at school, financial problems, family
problems, substance abuse problems, leadership, and maturity.
A vital aspect in the success of any military organization
is the role played by the commanding officer. He undertakes
enormous responsibility upon assumption of command. With the
lives of many men and women now in his hands, comes the
latitude to make decisions on what is best for his unit. This
may range from training and operational aspects to whether or
not there will be hot chow in the field. He is the one that
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is most "in- tune" with what the unit can or cannot do; what it
is capable of or not capable of achieving. This "hands-on"
approach is consistent with leadership and management theory
and models that typically describe this role as one that
"makes up" for the inadequacies of other parts of a system
(i.e., structure, goals, values, computer analysis, etc.)
.
The commanding officer quickly begins to assess and realize
the capabilities and limitations of his or her Marines first
hand. Regardless of what data in a service record book (SRB)
may say, it is the commander that probably knows if a Marine
has family problems, financial problems, a substance abuse
problem, a girlfriend that he is quite serious about or who is
pregnant, or, probably most importantly, whether there is a
lack of leadership skills and maturity. These things are some
of the reasons for failure from MSG school. It is the
commander who should know if these problems exist and thus
whether one of his or her Marines has "what it takes"; the
requisite motivation, determination, and interest in the MSG
program to successfully complete the school.
Looking beyond the school, once out on post, Wiskoff et
al
. (1989), found that the more controlled, responsible, and
dedicated MSGs are, the better they are able to avoid
potential problem areas. These are again areas that a good
commander will be able to recognize as either existing or not
existing and make his or her recommendations with this in
mind.
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Thus, while it may be proven that a Marine with a GT below
the required score of 90 has a 50 percent attrition rate from
the school, this also means that 50 percent of the Marines in
this category successfully complete the school. This latter
group would never have gotten to the school if their
commanding officer had not believed in them enough to request
a waiver to the GT score requirement
.
Sawyer (1978) found that an important aspect of the
problem of motivating students to perform better is early
recognition or identification of poor attitudes and low
motivational levels. These are areas that are usually
identified by a commander and would be cause not to recommend
sending a Marine to MSG school . Sending a Marine to MSG
school of this caliber who might otherwise be statistically
qualified according to the predictor model, would just not
make sense. Thus, the need for a "human touch;" decision-
making by someone close to the situation who has insight into
background factors that serve a predictive function and not
just a decision by a computer. Sawyer (1978) also believed
that such problems are best handled on a case-by-case basis by
those who have a first-hand acquaintance with the individual.
This further solidifies the notion that it is the commander's
judgement and recommendation in conjunction with the
background characteristics that must be utilized when deciding
whether a Marine is qualified for MSG duty. Never should a
Marine be sent to the school thinking this is just the thing
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to "get him motivated." If he is not motivated to go to MSG
school from the beginning, his attitude will likely not change
upon arrival. In the end, it may necessarily boil down to a
decision made at HQMC since they have access to all of the
records of the individual in question and may have information
the commander is not privy to (i.e., fitness reports from
previous commanders)
.
Finally, should the Marine Corps ever have to revert to a
non-volunteer MSG program, as the annual announcement of
quotas (by major command) to the field says is possible if
these quotas aren't made, much forethought will have to be put
into the matter by policy makers. Marines who don't want to
be at MSG school may actually try to fail, though this tactic
could damage their chances at promotion and a career in the
Marine Corps. Recruiting duty and drill instructor duty are
considered independent duty just as MSG duty is, but
restrictions imposed on MSGs are somewhat different. One of
the most pronounced differences is the requirement that a
Marine remain unmarried throughout the duration of his 3
month MSG tour. The incidence of Marines who are volunteers
getting married prior to the end of their MSG tour continues
to plaque MSG Battalion and results in early relief. This not
only results in disciplinary action to the Marine, but also
temporarily burdens the post he was assigned to since the
Marines there must then operate short-handed until a
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replacement arrives from another post or the next graduating
class
.
Though the predictor model certainly can be used as an
initial guide when trying to determine the success cf a
particular Marine at MSG school, the commander's
recommendation must also hold some weight in the final
outcome. To do otherwise would compromise the authority of
the commander, an individual on the scene who has seen the
Marine in action and knows what his capabilities are.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The Marine Corps, and the Armed Forces in general, face
some stiff manpower challenges in the upcoming years. A
shrinking defense budget and smaller manpower pools are two of
the major issues that are upon us and must be dealt with now .
Looking at attrition rates at our various service schools is
one way to start addressing these impending changes.
During the last four years, attrition rates from MSG
school have consistently hovered over 35 percent. As recently
as December 1992, this rate was 38 percent for watchstanders
(48 percent for SNCOs ) . (Miles, 1993) Marine Corps planners
currently take into account this historical attrition rate
when making assignments of personnel to MSG classes. That is,
they will assign 38 percent more watchstanders to a class than
they need to actually graduate. This is a necessity that will
always exist to some degree. However, the attrition rate of
36.45 percent found as a result of data provided for this
thesis is rather abysmal. When this attrition is measured in
dollars (dollar cost per student not available) it should be
viewed as significant and a problem that must be dealt with.
Looking at a pool of seventeen background variables
available from the HMF, this research found that seven of
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these were statistically significant (at the 10 percent level)
in predicting success at MSG school. These seven variables
represent a manageable and understandable set of
characteristics available to any commander or HQMC in
assessing the probability of success that any particular
Marine would have at the school . Examples were given
detailing how to do this utilizing the logit model.
The best case illustrated using this model was one which
represented attrition from the school at only ten percent.
However, the characteristics and qualifications this
particular Marine would have to possess were so high that they
would also qualify him for any commissioned officer program
the Marine Corps currently offers. This was unrealistic, but
was used to show to what extreme the Marine Corps would have
to go to bring down attrition. A more practical case was
demonstrated which would decrease attrition to below 30
percent. Utilizing this scenario, minimum standards would
have to be established or used as a guide for Marines who
apply to the program. As discussed in Chapter VI, instituting
these standards could only be accomplished when used in
conjunction with the local commander's recommendation. The
commander is the individual on the scene who possesses
knowledge of an applicant not found in any record book. He or
she will know better than anyone what the capabilities and
limitations of a Marine are and thus, whether the Marine
should apply for MSG duty or what type of recommendation
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should be forwarded. The commander should be given some
minimum standards to utilize in the initial screening of an
applicant to MSG school, but he or she should still maintain
the authority to request a waiver to these standards based on
personal knowledge and recommendations from other supervisors
of the Marine.
Just as discovered during previous studies by Wiskoff et
al. (1989) and Akst and Quester (1992), this study found GT
and PFT scores to be significant predictors of success at MSG
school. In addition, the current grade, current age, race,
rifle score, and TIG of the Marine were the other variables
that were found to be statistically significant and thus
included in the final predictive model.
This was the first indepth look at data available from the
HMF for the purposes of predicting success at MSG school,
though Akst and Quester (1992) had taken a cursory glance at
this area. The significance of this study was that the data
analyzed were available in the HMF prior to the Marine
reporting to school. Previous work by Wiskoff et al. (1989)
and Sherman et al. (1978) looked at data available after the
Marine graduated from MSG school. They received their data
directly from MSG school and did not have access to the HMF to
scrutinize all background characteristics. This "after the
fact" analysis may provide different results than that which
would have been obtained if analyzing these factors prior to
the Marine reporting to MSG school. The attempt to identify
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who will and will not graduate from MSG school should be done
using data available at the Marines' previous command and
before he actually enters the school. Yet, some of the same
variables identified as significant predictors of success from
the previous studies were also found to hold true with this
study. It is difficult to say then whether the predictive
results are skewed, and if so, to what degree, when analyzing
certain background information (i.e., PFT scores) on the
Marine from before versus after MSG school. Regardless, it
became obvious while proceeding with this study that
administrative offices must do a better job at entering timely
and accurate data into the JUMPS/MMS (computer keyboard entry
into the Joint Uniform Military Pay System/ Manpower
Management System which then becomes part of the HMF) on
individual Marines. As many as 152 records in one variable
category could not evaluated due to missing, incomplete, or
incorrect data in the HMF.
Whether measures are taken via stiffer requirements and
more thorough screening by the Marine applicants' commanding
officer or there is stricter adherence to any established
standards by HQMC, attrition rates for MSG school will
probably always hover between 2 to 3 percent. Even though
we must continue to ensure that only Marines of the highest
caliber are accepted for this program, attrition above 30
percent still appears high, though this may be acceptable to
the Marine Corps . Though establishing more stringent criteria
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will enable fewer Marines to apply, some of whom would have
graduated, I believe it is quality that will overcome the
notion of quantity and still provide enough numbers for this
highly visible program. Utilizing some of the thoughts and
tools provided in this thesis I believe this number can be
reduced. A start might be to raise the GT requirement to 95
and accept no waivers for scores below 90. At the same time
require all applicants to have first class PFT scores (225 and
higher) . Once changes like this have been in place for a
predetermined period of time, HQMC should reassess the
situation to determine what further action, if any, must be
enacted.
Artificial attrition rate limits should not be initially
established in concrete, but goals should be set forth in this
direction. If these goals can't be reached (attrition under
3 percent might be a start), only then should hard and fast
rules should be established and, most importantly, be adhered
to. At what point do we turn away a potential MSG applicant
is the question, but this difficult and perhaps unpopular
decision must be made. Some recommendations for action to
determine why this high attrition exists coupled with areas
for further study are included in the following section.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made based on the
research and results of this thesis:
1. A follow-on study could be undertaken to determine not
only the attrition rate once Marines leave MSG school and are
out on post, but also the causes. The numbers are important
however, it is equally important to know why. What caused the
problem? If it was an alcohol-related incident, was there
anything in the Marine's past that would have indicated a
problem in this area that should have been detected as part of
the screening process at MSG school or the Marine's former
unit? If so, perhaps we can alleviate problems of this nature
in the future and thus, reduce attrition.
2. It would be useful and interesting to know why Marines in
the 01, 30, and 35 occfields have a higher attrition rate from
MSG school than those in combat arms occfields who
traditionally possess lower GT scores. There may be a trend
that has previously gone unrecognized in this area. This
could become quite important should the Marine Corps ever have
to resort to a non-volunteer MSG program.
3. Utilizing the variables employed in the predictive model
for this study, it may be useful to develop some type of point
system chart (much like cutting scores for promotion or how
PFT scores are calculated) that would give the commander a
snapshot, based on historical data, of the potential or
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probability of a Marine to succeed at MSG school. This could
be incorporated into the commanding officer's checklist.
4. More emphasis and detailed consideration should be given
to administering the LEQ before a Marine reports to MSG
school. Currently, the test is given to all Marines once they
report to the school. The results then are used in some cases
as a foundation for dropping a Marine from the school. If the
test had been given at the previous command and evaluated by
qualified personnel, the Marine may never have been given
orders to school. This amounts to a cost savings in dollars
and human capital.
5. Many guesses could probably be made regarding the
unusually high attrition rate of minorities from MSG school
however, only a study into the exact causes will help the
Marine Corps alleviate any disparities. Thus, the question
for research: Why are minority (hispanics and blacks in this
study) attrition rates from MSG school so much higher than
whites?
6. Along the same lines as a study on minority attrition, the
question could also be extended to determining the specific
causes of attrition for each Marine. Not just the surface
causes - leadership, academics, alcohol - but the root causes
of these problems. Maybe there isn't an identifiable common
trait, but if there is it is yet another tool to be utilized
in slicing the overall attrition rate from MSG school.
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7. Are we unnecessarily hard on our Marines during MSG
school? All Marines at the school appear before a formal
board comprising the of f icer-in-charge of the school, a State
Department representative, and a clinical psychologist. Is
there too much latitude given these individuals in deciding to
drop an individual from the school? I don't know. I only
raise the question for thought. Are we screening out and
subsequently dropping Marines who might have otherwise
succeeded? Is the decision a subjective one or are there
criteria on which to decide whether to drop a Marine from MSG
school? Perhaps these are areas that warrant further
exploration
.
8. A cost benefit analysis to determine whether the MSG
program is in fact cost productive to the Marine Corps should
be a valid topic of concern during this period of downsizing
of the force. The high visibility of the job and related
positive effect on recruitment would also need to be
considered in conjunction with these costs. Are we getting
all the bang for our buck? Is the State Department
contributing its fair share into putting inexpensive, quality
labor out on post? Many such questions- need to be asked.
9. If the Marine Corps continues to support the State
Department with Marines for security duty throughout the
world, an indepth look needs to be taken at the viability of
a non-volunteer program. Perhaps the biggest question is
whether we can require Marines to remain unmarried during this
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30 month tour. During downsizing, which may take our end-
strength to 159,000 Marines or below, qualified volunteers
will become harder and harder to find.
10. Last, just as a point to consider, we sometimes suspect
or are actually able to determine that a Marines' previous
command has not completed the checklist as required (or better
yet, not completed it to our liking) . However, what we don't
know is how many Marines that the commanding officer has
turned away. He may have no fully qualified personnel to fill
the quota, but his back may be up against a wall and he has to
provide a body. Perhaps the fault doesn't always lie with the
commander, but with the system. Sister units, understandably
to some degree, don't always want to pick up the slack or an
additional quota for MSG school because they know they will
probably lose one of their better Marines. The Marine Corps
must continue to ensure that any direction or guidance that is




16 Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PFT), Form A, 1967
Edition - A widely used psychological personality measurement
instrument which evaluates sixteen different areas to
determine whether an individual is: warm, bright, stable,
assertive, enthusiastic, conscientious, bold, sensitive,
suspicious, imaginative, shrewd, worried, radical, self-
sufficient, controlled, or tense, and to what degree.
Armed Forces Mental Group (AFMG) - There are seven mental
groups (I, II, IIIA, IIIB, IVA, IVB, V) . The higher the
percentile score on the AFQT the lower the corresponding
mental group number. This higher score on the AFQT also
signifies a higher level of tramability . (Hawes, 1990)
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) - An aptitude composite
that consists of four of the ten ASVAB subtests: (1) word
knowledge (WK) ; (2) paragraph comprehension (PC); (3)
arithmetic reasoning (AR) ; and (4) numerical operations (NO)
.
AFQT scores are used to categorize individuals into an Armed
Forces Mental Group (AFMG) . Minimum AFQT scores are
incorporated into enlistment standards. AFQT is not used
specifically for job assignment.
Armed Forces Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) - It is a
well documented and studied battery of ten aptitude subtests
administered as a screening tool to all individuals entering
military service to evaluate academic and vocational
abilities. Although not designed specifically as an
intelligence test, the ASVAB does predict general trainability
of enlisted personnel. It is the military's test for
selecting and classifying new recruits. It has been studied,
improved, and used for over 40 years. The military does not
specifically attempt to determine the intelligence of its
potential candidates however, academic portions of the ASVAB
test have shown themselves to be reasonably defined
measurements of intelligence. (Warner, 1987)
General Classification Test (GCT) - The GCT was the measure of
aptitude used for enlisted Marines prior to 1980. It was a
score derived from three segments of the Army Classification
Battery 61. The were the verbal (VE) , arithmetic reasoning
(AR) , and pattern analysis (PA) subtests. When the GT score
was adopted by the Marine Corps as the standard measure of
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aptitude or intelligence, in the late 1970 's, the conversion
of the GCT was done by dropping the PA score.
General Technical (GT) - The GT is that portion of the ASVAB
that is considered the general intelligence score used for
placement of individuals into different occupational skills
and into different programs (i.e., officer, aviation) . The
Marine Corps GT composite is the aggregation of four component
test: (1) word knowledge (WK) ; (2) paragraph comprehension
(PC); (3) arithmetic reasoning (AR) ; and mechanical
comprehension (MC)
.
Motivation Analysis Test (MAT) , Form A, 1975 Edition - A
complex psychological testing instrument broken down into two
areas: integrated (conscious), which measures motivational
needs, and unintegrated (unconscious), which measures
satisfaction levels. Specifically, the scale descriptors
include career, dependency, security, self-indulgence,
responsibility, self -concept , heterosexuality , hostility,
self-assertion, and affection. High scores reflect positive
association with the scale dimension.
Physical Fitness Test (PFT) - The PFT is a measure of physical
fitness taken by all Marines semi-annually. It has three
parts: (1) a three mile run; (2) situps; and (3) pullups .
Points which can be accumulated on this test range form zero
to 300. Certain minimum scores are required to pass the PFT,
based on the age group a person falls into. In addition, the
PFT is divided into three classes (1st, 2nd, or 3rd) depending
on age and total points. As an example, a 300 PFT would
consist of running three miles under eighteen minutes, doing
20 pullups, and doing 80 situps in under two minutes.
Special Assignment Battery (SAB) - A biodata instrument
developed as a tool to aid in selecting individuals for
special assignments in the Navy and Marine Corps such as
recruiters, drill instructors, or recruit company commanders.
The SAB consists of measuring responses in sixteen areas
:
dominance, well-being, good natured, exhibitionism,
organization, age, extroversion, methodical,
religious/abstention, even-tempered, hard working, cautious,
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